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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON HEDGE FUND FEE CONTRACTS, MANAGERIAL 
INCENTIVES AND RISK TAKING BEHAVIORS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2011 
GONG ZHAN 
B.S., PEKING UNIVERSITY 
M.S., READING UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Bing Liang 
 
Under the principal-agent framework, the first essay studies and compares different 
compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find 
that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the 
symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the 
suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Both our theoretical models and simulation results 
show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water 
but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the 
manager’s skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, 
however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives. 
 Existing literature has detected a ”tournament behavior” among mutual fund managers 
that mid-year underperformers tend to take relatively higher risk than peers in the second half-
year. The second essay reexamines this issue and provides empirical evidence that such behavior 
does not exist among hedge fund managers, either at fund level or risk style level. Instead, hedge 
fund managers shift risk at mid-year in response to the moneyness of their incentive contracts. 
vii 
 
Also, risk shifting decisions are more driven by underperformance than by outperformance. High 
Water Mark can strongly rein in excess risk-taking and therefore better aligns interests. Last, risk 
shifting on average does not improve either performance, moneyness of incentive contracts, or 
cash inflows. 
The third essay uses factor models and optimal changepoint regression models to capture 
the intra-year risk dynamics of hedge fund managers. Those risk shifting managers are further 
divided into Informed’, ’Uninformed’ and ’Misinformed’ groups, according to their post-shifting 
risk adjusted performance. We find evidence that supports the existence of an ’Adverse Selection’ 
problem of managers compensation schemes. Namely, incentive contracts, designed to share risks 
and align interests, induce the strongest risk taking from the least informed or skilled hedge fund 
managers, whose risk-shifting decisions result in undesired or even deteriorated risk-adjusted 
returns for investors. We also find that the High Water Mark has only limited influence on 
mitigating excessive risk shifting. 
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CHAPTER 1
MANAGER FEE CONTRACTS AND
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
1.1 Introduction and Literature Review
Mutual funds and hedge funds are very distinct investment vehicles that differ in many
ways such as the degree of regulatory oversight, the characteristics of the typical investors,
leverage and derivatives usage, and investment strategies employed, etc. At the heart of
these differences is the compensation structure for asset managers of each industry. A
typical hedge fund fee structure usually features an asset-based and flat-rate management
fee plus a performance-based and option-like incentive fee, possibly coupled with a loss
carry-forward provision known as high water mark (HWM). By contrast, most mutual fund
managers are compensated by an asset-based fee, possibly plus some other fees not based
on performance, such as sale charges, redemption fees, and distribution fees. Only a very
small portion of mutual funds feature an incentive fee1. This fee, also known as a “fulcrum
fee”, however, unlike the form of incentive fees employed by hedge funds and most private
partnerships, must be exercised symmetrically by law2.
1Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) find that in 1999, only 108 out of a total 6,716 bond and stock mutual
funds used incentive fees.
2The specifications of the fulcrum fee were firstly enacted in a 1970 amendment to the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940. According to the amendment, the incentive fee must be centered around an benchmark
index. Any increases in fees for performance above that index must be matched by decreases in fees for
performance below the index.
1
Fund managers’ compensation schemes have long been of special interests to both aca-
demics and practitioners. In their seminal work, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft
(1999) point out that
“Four basic mechanisms mitigate principal-agent problems (between investors and fund
managers): incentive contracts, ownership structure, market forces, and government regu-
lation. Hedge funds generally emphasize the first two solutions. In contrast, mutual funds
tend to rely more heavily on the latter two.”
In addition, they find a strong association between incentive fees and the Sharpe ratio.
Liang (1999) conducts a similar cross-sectional analysis of performance with respect to
incentive fees and management fees. He finds a significantly relation between performance
and incentive fee but management fee is not significantly related to performance. ? find
superior performance for hedge funds with a fixed percentage and bonus-based incentive
structure.
We compare a flat-fee contract and an incentive contract in Model I and II. We conclude
that the optimality of each form of contracts depends heavily on the informational setting
in consideration.
Although performance-based compensation schemes have become quite popular in re-
cent years, there is considerable debate among academics over whether the symmetric in-
centive fee required by the SEC is in fact economically justified based on modern financial
economics, especially when compared to the option-like incentive fee prevailing in hedge
fund industry. For example, Starks (1987) studies two types of incentive contracts for mu-
tual fund managers and shows that the ’symmetric” contract dominates the ’bonus’ contract
in aligning the manager’s interests with those of the investors since the former will motivate
the manager to select the investor’s desired risk level and the latter tends to induce extra
risk taking. Golec (1992) also applies a principal-agent model to mutual fund management
and finds that incentive contracts impact both return and risk through information produc-
tion. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003), however, take the view that mutual fund’s fulcrum
2
fees with limits can always be converted to an equivalent never-negative incentive fee. As
a result, differences between a symmetric and an asymmetric incentive fee are not large.
We discuss the asymmetry of incentive contacts in Model III and find that option-like
bonus plan is inferior to a symmetric incentive plan since the former induces less effort
than the latter.
As Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) suggest, ownership structure also
matters in aligning managers’ interests with those of investors. Carpenter (2000) finds that
the option compensation for a fund manager does not strictly lead to greater risk seek-
ing behavior. If he trades his own account, then the manager’s optimal volatility is less.
Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) shows that risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial
amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund as well.
We investigate management wealth in Model IV and conclude that personal capital is
an effective tool in enhancing managerial effort.
An extended body of academic research has shown concerns about that managers tend
to be tempted to take excess risk when compensated by the option-like incentive plan, and
discusses how the use of HWM, a loss recovery provision by many hedge funds, may limit
the problem of excess risk taking behaviors by fund managers. Goetzmann, Ingersoll and
Ross (2003) propose a theoretical model to evaluate the cost of the HWM provision to
managers and compute the alpha-generation skill necessary to justify a fund manager’s
compensation. Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) use a mutli-year evaluation to show that
manager’s risk taking is more diverse than can be generated by existing one-period models.
Panageas and Westerfield (2009) point out that in order to maintain the continuation value
of option-like incentive contracts, managers do not increase risk indefinitely due to infinite
horizions. Aragon and Qian (2007) study HWM in an informational setting where the man-
ager quality is unknown to investors. They find that funds imposing liquidity constraints
are more likely to have HWMs to reduce risk of investor-driven liquidation.
We study the combined usage of an option-like incentive contract and HWM in Model
3
V and emphasize the dual effects of incentive that HWM may give rise to. However, our
study focuses on the induction of managerial effort rather than the impact on risk-taking
and we show that HWM can sometimes surprisingly hurt effort.
Our paper contributes to hedge fund literature in two ways. Firstly, we theoretically
and numerically exhibit how the distribution rule and the risk sharing rule embedded in
a compensation scheme may impact managerial effort in the long run. Among the many
findings is that HWM does not always foster effort. It can also harm incentive and therefore
it could be in the investor’s interest to reset HWM after a period of poor performance.
Secondly, we find that no contractual factor has a dominating role in motivating man-
agerial effort. Each factor’s impact is highly conditional on other factors as well as infor-
mational setting, fund characteristics and manager characteristics. Also, each factor may
have very distinct implications for managers and investors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as the following. In Section 2, we present
our single-period model and compare five different compensation contracts under different
informational settings. In Section 3, we demonstrate our findings in single-period models
by numerical results. In Section 4, we expand our single-period models to a multi-period
horizon. In Section 5, we use simulation to illustrate induced managerial effort when we
have multi-year horizons and finally Section 6 concludes.
1.2 A Single-Period Model
In a single-period framework, we study a standard principal-agent model between a
representative investor (the principal) and a fund manager (the agent), employing a similar
problem formation from Ross (1973) and Holmstrom (1979). Our focus is on how a specific
compensation scheme affects a manager’s incentive for making efforts.
Without losing generality, we consider a representative investor who owns a hedge
fund firm3, with initial investment I. The firm employs an asset manager and the man-
3This assumption is loosened in Model IV, in which the manager also has her stake invested in the hedge
4
ager chooses an effort level e ∈ [0,∞) at the beginning of each period. Effort e costs the
manager c(e). We further assume c(·) is twice continuously differentiable, with c′ > 0
and c′′ > 0. The interpretation is that e is a productive input with direct disutility for the
manager and this creates an inherent difference in objectives between the principal and
the agent. It is convenient to think of e as managerial actions, e.g. employing advanced
technology to monitor the market and adjust portfolios accordingly, conducting innovative
research in proprietary trading strategies, doing due diligence on target products, compa-
nies or markets, building up and maintaining networks to gather market information, and
etc. The manager’s utility is thus defined over both wealth and effort, which utility is also
known as additively separable: The net utility of a manager who chooses effort level e and
has terminal wealth w is expressed by U(w,e) = u(w)− c(e). The manager is risk-averse
over her total wealth w4, with utility function u(w). We assume u(w) is twice continuously
differentiable, with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. The investor’s utility function G = g(w) is defined
over wealth alone and she may or may not be risk-neutral, i.e., g′′ ≤ 0.
Together with a random state of nature θ , the effort level e determines a monetary
outcome and thus an end-of-period return r, measured in percentage, on the investor’s
principal I. In the same spirit of Mirrlees (1976), we suppress θ and view r as a random
variable with a distribution F(r,e), parameterized by manger’s effort. Hence we formulate
the effort-production relationship r = r(e,θ) by F(r,e) in general. It is assumed that both
parties agree on the probability distribution of θ and that the agent chooses e before θ is
known. It is easy to see that re ≥ 0 implies Fe(r,e) ≤ 0, so that a change in e has a non-
trivial effort on the distribution of r5. In particular, an increase in e will shift the distribution
of r to the right in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Among many possible
distributions of F that describe the effort-production relationship and meanwhile have the
properties stated above, we specifically assume the following distribution throughout this
fund.
4The manager is assumed to be risk-averse since the problem of moral hazard can be avoided when the
agent is risk-neutral, (Harris and Raviv (1979)).
5It will be assumed that for every e, Fe(r,e)< 0 at least for some r-values.
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paper,
r = x(e)+ ε (1.1)
Where x(·) describes the impact of managerial effort on returns, with x′ ≥ 0. ε is a
normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance σ2. This specification
implies that an asset manager can improve the mean value of returns, or long-term perfor-
mance by exerting more costly effort through x(e). However, the realization of r is also
subject to randomness or risk that the fund is exposed to through ε 6.Assume f (r|e) is
the probability density function of realized return conditional on manager’s effort. After r
is realized, the dollar return Ir, is then divided between the investor and the manager ac-
cording to a compensation scheme s7 designed for the manager8. Therefore, the investor’s
income will be Ir− s.Given the setting above, a typical principal-agent problem between
an investor and a fund manager could be depicted by the following optimization problem.
The investor maximizes the expected utility of her net income by choosing a compensa-
tion scheme s for the manager and also a desired effort level e to induce from the manager
at the beginning of the period,
max
e,s
E[G(w)] =
∫
g(Ir− s)dF(r|e) (1.2)
subject to
1. Manager’s participation constraint
g(s− c(e))≥ u¯0 (1.3)
6In practice, a hedge fund manager has a lot more discretion in adjusting her risk exposure than a mutual
fund manager since the former has much more access to the usage of derivatives and leverage than the latter.
7Depending on different information settings, s could be either a function of effort e or an output indicator
r.
8Admittedly in practice, it is usually the manager who proposes a compensation scheme for potential
investors to contract upon. However, it is not of so much importance as to who designs the scheme, and we
are more interested in how a specific compensation structure induces managerial effort.
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where u¯0 is the manager’s reservation (or best alternative) utility level.This constraint
guarantees the agent a minimum utility.
2. Manager’s incentive compatibility constraint
e ∈ argmax
e
E[U(w,e)] =
∫
u(s)dF(r|e)− c(e) (1.4)
This constraint guarantees that the manager finds it optimal to exert the investor’s de-
sired level of effort. This constraint plays a central role in almost all principal-agent rela-
tionships since there will be conflict of interests if this constraint is not satisfied.
1.2.1 Model I–A Fixed Fee Contract under Symmetric Information
We start from discussing an optimal compensation structure under symmetric informa-
tion. Suppose that the investor can directly observe the manager’s effort so that the manager
cannot take any private action in her management. Since effort is observable, its level can
be made part of the contract, and the manager can propose a ’take it or leave it’ contract
upon the observed effort level. The optimization problem that the investor has is thus,
max
e,s(e)
E[G(w)] =
∫
g(Ir− s(e))dF(r|e) (1.5)
subject to
1.
g(s(e)− c(e))≥ u¯0 (1.6)
2.
e ∈ argmax
e
E[U(w,e)] =
∫
u(s(e))dF(r|e)− c(e) (1.7)
One possible optimal contract is,
7
s(x(e)) =
 f (u¯0+ c(e)), if e= e
∗
0, if e 6= e∗
(1.8)
Where f = u−1 is the inverse function of u. e∗ is the target effort level which solutes
the investor’s maximization problem (2.2). This contract is optimal because it maximizes
the utility of both the investor and the manager9. Furthermore, the contract is efficient
because there is no way to make either party better off without harming the other. It is
worth noting that e∗ is solved without the incentive compatibility constraint and we refer
to as the first-best efficient level of effort, which entails the optimal risk sharing.
The contract in Model I implies a flat-rate fee for the manager and the result above
sheds lights on explaining the prevailing fee structure in the mutual fund industry. The
model shows that when effort is much observable, it is possible for an investor to induce
the first-best effort level from the manager by providing her with a compensation scheme
not directly associated with performance. In practice, all US mutual funds must register
with the SEC and send audited financial reports to the SEC on a quarterly basis. They are
required to value their portfolios and price their securities daily based on market quota-
tions that are readily available at market value or fair value. Moreover, mutual funds are
required by law to allow shareholders to redeem their shares on a daily basis, in addition to
providing investors with timely information regarding the value of their investments. This
transparency and existing mechanism for investors, though probably not in the favor of
mutual fund managers, makes it easy for investors to observe managers’ effort.
9It is also optimal for the manager because if on one hand, she chooses e∗, then her utility will be
u(s(x(e∗)))−c(e∗) = u0. If on the other hand, she shirks from e∗, then her payoff will be 0−c(e) =−c(e)≤ 0
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1.2.2 Model II-A Linear Contract (When Incentive Fee is Symmetric)
under Asymmetric Information
Unlike mutual fund managers, most hedge fund managers charge a performance fee on
top of a management fee. By the principal-agent theory, this fee structure is mainly due to
the existence of asymmetric information between the investor and the manager rising from
the fact that hedge funds are subject to very limited government oversight and disclosure
requirement. Since the investor cannot largely observe a hedge fund manager’s action, e.g.
portfolio holdings, trading strategies, and expenses, etc, she needs to render a portion of
output to the manager and provide the manager with a performance-based compensation
scheme in order to share risk10 and align interests11. That is, under asymmetric information,
the compensation scheme s cannot be a function of effort e, but of the output r. It is,
therefore, of interest to investigate how a performance-based incentive contract may help
the investor to induce managerial effort12.
There are mainly two types of incentive fees observed in the asset investment industry,
namely, the symmetric incentive fee (or the fulcrum fee required for U.S mutual funds) and
the asymmetric incentive fee (or the bonus plan adopted by most hedge funds). We discuss
the former in Model II and the latter in Model III.
A symmetric incentive fee scheme for a manager can be described by,
s(r) = αI+β Ir (1.9)
where α and β , both positive and measured in percentage, are management fee and
performance fee, respectively. This compensation scheme is symmetric in the sense that
10Note that in Model I where there is asymmetric information, the investor is the residual claimant of
output and therefore bears all production risk in the principal-agent relationship.
11With some sufficient conditions satisfied (see Rogerson (1985)), the theory of contracts states a very
important feature of the optimal contract: the optimal compensation with unobservable effort is a random
variable, rather than a fixed amount.
12Holmstrom (1979) proves that the principal would like to see the agent increase her effort given the
performance-based sharing rule.
9
on one hand, if the end-of-period return is larger than zero, then the manager is awarded
by receiving a proportion of the return on top of the management fee; on the other hand,
if the end-of-period return is less than zero, then the manager is penalized by receiving a
total compensation less than the management fee, since the second term on the right-hand
side in this case is negative.
We solve the investor’s expected utility maximization problem again with the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (2.4) binding. This constraint implies that for a given linear
contract s(r), the manager chooses an effort level e to maximize her expected utility. Math-
ematically,
max
e
E[U(s(r),e)] =
∫
u(s(r))dF(r|e)− c(e)
=
∫
u(αI+β Ir) f (r|e)dr− c(e) (1.10)
The First Order Condition (FOC) is then
∂E[U ]
∂e
=
∫
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e) = 0 (1.11)
The optimal effort e∗∗ induced by the symmetric incentive contract solves the above
FOC. That is,
∫
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e∗∗)dr = c′(e∗∗) (1.12)
In order to compare the induced optimal effort level to that in Model I, we assume that
both the investor (principal) and the manager(agent) have a CARA utility function with
different risk aversion parameters λp ≥ 0 and λa > 0, respectively.
g(w) =−e−λpw (1.13)
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u(w) =−e−λaw (1.14)
According to Appendix A.1, the optimal effort level e∗ in Model 1 satisfies,
c′(e∗) = λaI(u¯0+ c(e∗))x′(e∗) (1.15)
According to Appendix A.2, the optimal effort level e∗∗ in Model 2 satisfies,
c′(e∗∗) = λaβ I exp(−λaαI−λaβ Ix(e∗∗)+ λ
2
aβ 2I2σ2
2
)x′(e∗∗) (1.16)
Notice that the left-hand side of both equations is the same marginal cost function for
the manager, and the right-hand side is the marginal profit function. Although it is difficult
to obtain the closed-form expression for e∗ and e∗∗, it is still possible to compare these two
effort levels induced by different compensation schemes. We next discuss the scenarios in
which one effort level is higher than the other by comparing the coefficient of x′(e) in the
two marginal profit functions. We find that σ20 as follows equates the two marginal profit
functions,
σ20 =
2(ln( u¯0+cβ )+λaαI+λaβ Ix)
λ 2aβ 2I2
(1.17)
When σ2 > σ20 , the marginal profit function of Model II is larger than that of Model I.
As a result, e∗∗ is larger than e∗ and vice versa. Graphically, when σ2 is high enough, the
intersection of Marginal Cost(MC) and Marginal Profit(MP) in Model II is to the right of
that in Model I and therefore a linear contract induces more effort than a fixed fee contract
does.
This comparison sheds some light on the rationale behind the use of fixed fee contracts
and linear contracts (symmetric incentive fees) by mutual funds. Our models have shown
that when there is much uncertainty embedded in the effort-production relationship (re-
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flected by a large σ2), the principal may find it more optimal to associate agent’s compen-
sation s to the output r than providing a fixed fee contact s(e), since the former can solicit
more managerial effort e and enhance the long-term performance through E[r] = x(e) in
repeated contracts. Put in another way, a linear contract is a useful tool for the investor to
share risk and align interests when she believes that the forthcoming production process
will be very volatile.
The above discussion is consistent with the empirical results in Elton, Gruber and Blake
(2003). They find that the 108 mutual funds with incentive fees, which amounts to 1.7% of
the total number of mutual fund family in their sample, do exhibit (1) higher risk, (2) better
risk-adjusted long-term performance, and (3) greater stock picking ability, which can be
seen as a good proxy for managerial effort. Yet the authors conclude that the main driving
force for the greater risk-taking behavior is the incentive fee, we add that the projected risk
of a fund’s future performance is in turn a key determinant of the compensation scheme
designed for the fund manager. Specifically, if a fund manager is believed to take high-
risk trading strategies or to hold very risky assets, then it is optimal for the investor to use
incentive contracts to align interests and solicit effort. A weak support can be also drawn
from Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003), in which the authors find that no money-market
mutual fund uses incentive contracts. Starks (1987) also finds that low-beta mutual funds
do not use incentive fees.
1.2.3 Model III-An Option-like Contract (When Incentive Fee is Asym-
metric) under Asymmetric Information
Symmetric incentive contracts, however, are not embraced by the hedge fund industry
since they imply a severe penalty for the manager when her performance is poor. Instead,
almost all hedge funds feature an asymmetric (or option-like) incentive fee structure. The
most popular one is “2% and 20%”, a 2% flat management fee and a 20% incentive fee.
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This incentive fee in reality awards hedge fund managers with 20% of positive return 13and
exerts no penalty even if the return is negative. We next examine whether or not this option-
like contract induces more managerial effort and thus better long-term performance than a
linear contract.
Suppose now the investor offers the manager an option-like compensation scheme s(r)
that is nonlinear in the realized output r as follows,
s(r) =
 αI+β Ir, for r ≥ 0αI, for r < 0 (1.18)
Accordingly, the manager’s incentive problem becomes,
max
e
E[U(s(r),e)] =
∫
u(s(r))dF(r|e)− c(e)
=
∫
u(αI+β Ir ·1{r≥0}) f (r|e)dr− c(e) (1.19)
s(r) =
 αI+β Ir, for r ≥ 0αI, for r < 0 (1.20)
where 1{r≥0} =
 1, for r ≥ 00, otherwise is an indicator function of r.
FOC
13Assume there is no HWM provision.
13
∂E[U ]
∂e
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(αI+β Ir ·1{r≥0}) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e)
=
∫ 0
−∞
u(αI) fe(r|e)dr+
∫ ∞
0
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr+
∫ 0
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e)dr
− c′(e)
= 0 (1.21)
The optimal effort e∗∗∗ equates the MP and MC in FOC.
∫ ∞
−∞
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e∗∗∗)dr+
∫ 0
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e∗∗∗)dr = c′(e∗∗∗) (1.22)
Comparing (1.22) to Model II’s FOC in (1.12), we see that the only difference is the
second term on the LFS of the above equation. According to Appendix A.3,
∫ 0
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e∗∗∗)dr < 0 (1.23)
It then follows that for a given effort level, the MP for manager in Model III, where the
incentive is asymmetric, is less than that in Model II, where the incentive is symmetric. As
a result, the optimal effort level, which is the intersection of the MP and MC, is lower in
Model III than in Model II. Graphically,
This finding clearly reveals the suboptmality of an asymmetric incentive contract in
terms of induced managerial effort. Moreover, this result is derived without making much
assumption about the manager’s utility function and the final return’s probability distri-
bution. The economic explanation for this suboptimality is that the option-like incentive
contract transfers the downside risk that the manager bears under a symmetric contract to
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the investor. The new risk sharing rule changes the subjective probability distribution about
the output that the manager perceives in the manager’s favor. That is, with the same level
of effort spent, she in essence has a higher expected utility from compensation under an
option-like incentive contract than under a linear one. Since effort is costly to the manager,
she would rather exert less effort when rebalancing her MP and MC.
A similar suboptimality is also addressed by Starks (1987). She finds that compared to
symmetric incentive fees, bonus fees (asymmetric) motivate managers to choose an even
lower level of resource expenditure and a higher-than-optimal level of risk. Elton, Gruber
and Blake (2003), however take an opposing view and state that those two types of incentive
contracts are equivalent and can be converted to each other.
1.2.4 Model IV–An Option-like Contract with Management Wealth
In practice, many investment funds and limited liability partnerships that use option-like
incentive contracts, such as hedge funds, CTAs, venture capitals and real estate partner-
ships, allow managers to invest own wealth and hold stakes in their firms. The Lipper-Tass
hedge fund database reports that as to 2008, 2568 out of 9116 hedge funds (from both
graveyard dataset and live fund dataset) have management wealth14. This ownership struc-
ture makes these managers a principal as well as an agent and therefore has nontrivial in-
fluence on the principal-agent relationship. We next examine how an asymmetric incentive
contract, combined with management wealth, motivates managers to exert effort.
Assume that the proportion of management wealth to total assets under management
is k. The manager’s net income is thus composed of two parts, the fees collected on the
principal’s investment and the accrued interest (or incurred loss) on personal investment,
s(r) =
 (1− k)(αI+β Ir)+ kIr, for r ≥ 0(1− k)αI+ kIr, for r < 0 (1.24)
14Lipper-Tass reports a “personal capital” dummy variable.
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The manager’s optimization problem is,
max
e
E[U(s(r),e)] =
∫
u(s(r))dF(r|e)− c(e)
=
∫
u((1− k)(αI+β Ir ·1{r≥0})+ kIr) f (r|e)dr
− c(e) (1.25)
The FOC
∂E[U ]
∂e
=
∫ 0
−∞
u((1− k)αI+ kIr) fe(r|e)dr
+
∫ ∞
0
u((1− k)(αI+β Ir)+ kIr) fe(r|e)dr
− c′(e)
= 0 (1.26)
The optimal effort ek equates the MP and MC in the FOC
∫ 0
−∞
u((1− k)αI+ kIr) fe(r|ek)dr+
∫ ∞
0
u((1− k)(αI+β Ir)+ kIr) fe(r|ek)dr = c′(ek)
(1.27)
According to Appendix A.4, the MP of (1.27) is larger than that in (1.22). As a result,
ek is larger than e∗∗∗. Graphically
The economic interpretation for the increased effort level is intuitive. With her wealth
invested in the fund that she manages, (1) on the downside, the manager now is subject
to a proportion of production risk and thus a decreased expected utility; (2) on the upside,
she can collect more fees than with no personal investment, when r(1−β )−α > 0. Both
effects motivate the manager to exert more effort to enhance long-term performance. In
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fact, the manager’s investment can be seen as a form of symmetric incentive fee at k since
it penalizes managers for poor performance and awards managers for positive returns. We
therefore conclude that allowing management wealth can effectively mitigate the subopti-
mality an option-like incentive contract may bring.
1.2.5 Model V–An Option-like Contract with High Water Mark
Recent years witness a trend in which more and more hedge fund managers add a
loss carry forward provision, the high water mark (HWM), to their option-like incentive
contracts. A fund with HWM has to retrieve previous loss before charging incentive fees.
In practice, a HWM fund keeps records of its NAV’s historical high and charges incentive
fees quaterly, semi-annually or yearly only if current NAV exceeds the historical record.
We next propose a model to examine how such a loss carry forward provision motivates
managers to employ effort.
Assume that at the beginning of each period, a fund manager evaluates the loss she
needs to recover and calculates the ’required return to reach the last watermark’15. To
illustrate, assume the previous NAV is NAV−1 and the historicial high is NAV ∗, then the
required return to reach the last watermark is h = max{NAV
∗−NAV−1,0}
NAV−1 . Apparently, h ≥ 0.
When h = 0, the fund’s NAV is currently at historical high. It then immediately follows
that h= 0 at the inception of a fund. The compensation scheme for the manager is thus16,
s(r) =
 αI+β Ir, for r ≥ hαI, for r < h (1.28)
The manager’s optimization problem is then,
15This concept is borrowed from Chakraborty and Ray (2008)
16Notice that this scheme is hypothetical and rarely observed in practice. However, it serves to better
explain a more realistic one addressed after.
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max
e
E[U(s(r),e)] =
∫
u(s(r))dF(r|e)− c(e)
=
∫
u(αI+β Ir ·1{r≥h}) f (r|e)dr− c(e) (1.29)
The FOC
∂E[U ]
∂e
=
∫ h
−∞
u(αI) fe(r|e)dr+
∫ ∞
h
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e)+
∫ h
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e)dr
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e)+
∫ 0
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e)dr
+
∫ h
0
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e)dr (1.30)
The optimal effort level eh equates the MP and MC in the FOC,
∫ ∞
−∞
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|eh)dr+
∫ 0
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|eh)dr
+
∫ h
0
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|eh)dr = c′(eh) (1.31)
It is worth noting that the first two terms are the same as the case when there is no
HWM. We then examine the third term so as to compare to the no HWM case. Denote the
third term by A,
A(h,e) =
∫ h
0
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e)dr (1.32)
It is easy to see that
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A(0,e) = 0 (1.33)
We then attempt to depict the function shape of A(h,e). According to Appendix A.5,
we have
∂A(h,e)
∂e

> 0, for h< x(e)
= 0, for h= x(e)
< 0, for h> x(e)
(1.34)
Combining the results in (1.33) and (1.34), we obtain a preliminary cognition about
the functional relationship between A(h,e) and h. A(h,e) starts at zero when h = 0, then
it increases in h until h = x(e).17 When h > x(e), A(h,e) starts decreasing in h. Thus,
although we do not know the concrete shape of A(h,e), It is safe to point out that A is
positive on the interval (0,x(e)]. Depending on the value of h, A(h,e) takes on very distinct
properties as follows,
(1) If h is very small, smaller than the mean return x(e∗∗∗) implied by the effort level
e∗∗∗ the manager finds optimal without a HWM, i.e. the required return to recover previous
loss is within the scope of manager’s average performance level x(e∗∗∗), then according to
(1.33) and (1.34), A> 0. Therefore, the MP curve in (1.31) is to the right of that in (1.22)
and as a result, the optimal effort level eh is larger than e∗∗∗. Graphically,
(2) If h is very large and the upper bound of x(e) is very small, then according to Ap-
pendix A.6, A(h,e)< 0. That is to say, if a manager’s skill level is very low and meanwhile
she is subject to huge previous loss to recover, then with HWM in her compensation con-
tract, to the very opposite of (1), she will find it optimal to decrease the effort level for the
current period. Graphically,
In reality, the compensation schemes with HWM do not usually take the form we dis-
cussed. Instead, incentive fees are charged on the increase in NAVs over historical high.
17Assuming x(e)> 0, that is, a fund manager’s mean return is always positive.
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That is, a more realistic incentive contract with HWM is as follows,
s(r) =
 αI+β I(r−h), for r ≥ hαI, for r < h (1.35)
Compared to the hypothetical contract in (1.28), the one above does not change the
probability for the manager to charge incentive fees at all, however, lowering the amount of
incentive fees charged by Iβh and therefore slightly decreasing the MP for the manager in
(1.31). Nevertheless, we confirm that this difference does not substantially alter the shape
of A(h,e) and its properties that we obtain in (1.34) remain valid.
The above results in Model V can be readily related to reality since they demonstrate
the following four scenarios in hedge fund management when HWM is in effect,
1. If a fund is currently a little under the water, then the manager has positive incentive
to increase effort, which is in the best interest of the investor.
2. Incentive keeps going up along with the distance to the watermark, and reaches max-
imum when the distance exactly equals the manager’s skill level (x(e)).
3. If the fund is deeper under the water than the manager’s skill level (when h> x(e)),
incentive to exert more effort begins to shrink but can still be positive.
4. Under certain circumstances, i.e. when the upper bound of manager’s skill level x(e)
is too low and when the fund is too deep under the water, the incentive to increase
effort disappears. Moreover, the manager now has negative incentive and decreases
her effort level instead.
The above findings are in line with numerous academic articles in hedge fund literature
that HWM is employed to align interestes between investors and managers by inducing
managerial effort and alleviating manager’s excess risk-taking behavior tempted by option-
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like incentive18. However, we are the first to point out that the HWM’s function is double-
fold. Although designed to solicit effort, HWM can well dampen manager’s incentive to
exert effort when the chance of charging incentive fees is slim and when the manager’s
skill level is too low to recover previous loss. Support for the above conclusion can be
found in the literature of corporate finance. A number of articles document that many
firms which reward managers with stock options reset the strike price after a long period
of poor performance. Although the reasons behind the reset are multifold, one of them is
clear, holding deep out of the money options does not motivate managers to exert effort.
With HWM, a hedge fund manager’s incentive compensation can be seen as a call option
with the strike set to the historical high NAV. Therefore, after repeated periods of poor
performance, the call option is likely to fall deep out of money and then lose the incentive
for the manager. In practice, some HWM funds reset their HWMs after a long period of
poor performance and some even close for new investment, which is another means to reset
the strike price.
1.3 Numerical Single-Period Results
1.3.1 Parameters and Model Specification
The five theoretical models we have discussed thus far are general in forms. In order
to obtain more comparable results, we need to evaluate the models with more specific
functions and parameters. Similar to Chakraborty and Ray (2008), we assume that the cost
function of effort is quadratic and scaled by the size of the principal, I,
c(e) =
I
2
e2 (1.36)
x(e), the function that links effort with monthly returns is represented by the natural
18For details, please refer to Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009),
etc.
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logrithm of (1+ e), divided by 2,
x(e) =
ln(1+ e)
2
(1.37)
Note that x(e) ≥ 0 for e ≥ 0 and x′(e) > 0 for e ≥ 0. The above specification for the
cost function and the production function is consistent with decreasing returns to scale with
respect to increased marginal effort expenditure. The manager’s risk aversion λa is set to 1.
All free parameters are listed in Table 1.1
1.3.2 Comparison of symmetric fees and asymmetric fees
With specification of free parameters, we are able to numerically solve Model I’s FOC
in (1.11) and Model II’s FOC in (1.21)for the induced effort level e∗∗ and e∗∗∗, respectively.
We can then in turn examine how the induced effort level affacts the average returns of a
fund as well as how a fee contract distributes the realized income (or loss) between the
manager and the investor. Table 1.2 reports the numerical results under different sets of
parameter values and major findings are as follows,
1. Induced Effort Level
In all cases, asymmetric fee contracts induce lower effort level and therefore lower
average returns than symmetric fee contracts. This suboptimality, according to our
models, is due to the fact that asymmetric fees (without HWM) expose the manager
to no downside risk and therefore provide her with less incentive to input effort.
2. Effort and Risk
With symmetric fees, the manager’s induced effort level increases in σ . To the oppo-
site, with asymmetric fees, the manager’s induced effort level decreases in σ . That is,
when the production process is subject to increased risk, symmetric contracts fosters
effort and asymmetric contracts kill incentives. The reason is that when a risk-averse
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manager, who is compensated by symmetric contracts, faces greater variation in pro-
duction, she will demand more risk premium and is therefore willing to enhance
the expected return by exerting more effort. However, when she is compensated by
asymmetric contracts, increased variation can bring her more fees on the upside and
does not hurt her on the downside. Therefore, the manager will find it lucrative to
withdraw costly effort and collect more fees on the increased upside fluctuation.
3. Fees and Risk
In almost all cases, the fees collected by managers increase in σ , which means that
managers are likely to have incentive to take excess risk in order to boost compensa-
tion. However, a few exceptions take place that when high-skill managers increase
risk, their fees can drop in some cases (when β =10%, 20% and 30% and σ changes
from 10% to 15%). It implies that high-skill managers have less incentive than low-
skill managers to manipulate risk and more incentive to exert effort.
4. The Investor’s Net-Fee Income
In all cases, symmetric contracts bring the investor higher net-fee income than asym-
metric contracts. Besides, symmetric contracts bring the investor more income when
she undertakes more risk, while asymmetric contracts bring less, showing that sym-
metric contracts is a better tool to align interests than asymmetric contracts. A most
dramatic comparison takes place when the manager is of low-skill (x = 3ln(1+ e)),
the incentive fee is 30% and the fund is at high production risk (σ = 30%). With
symmetric contracts, the manager can expect to gain 88.04% of her principal, while
with asymmetric contracts, she on average loses 4.33% of her principal after fee19.
5. β and Incentive
In this paper, β refers to the ’incentive fee rate’. In Table 1.2, we see that β does
19In practice, admittedly, symmetric incentive fees always have a upper limit and lower limit on size.
Therefore, our results about the investor’s net-fee income should be rather considered as the upper bound.
The difference between the two types of incentive fees in practice is thus less dramatic.
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provide incentive in the sense that the average returns and the manager’s income
increase in β with very few exceptions. However, it is worth noting that increase in β
does not necessarily lead to increase in the investor’s net-fee income. To the contrary,
when the manager’s skill level is low and risk is high, an increase in the incentive fee
rate actually incurs more loss to the investor under an asymmetric contract. The
reason is that the extra effort induced by β in these cases can not compensate for the
increased fee charged on the investor.
1.3.3 Impact of Management Wealth on Effort
Table 1.3 reports the numerical results of Model IV where the manager is allowed to
invest personal capital in the fund she is running. Major findings are as follows,
1. Management Wealth and Incentive
In almost all cases, the average return, the manager’s income and the investor’s net-
fee income increase in k, the proportion of management wealth to all assets under
management. As discussed in Model IV, the reason is that with own wealth invested
in the fund, the manager is in fact subject to downside risk and therefore penalized
for poor performance. She thus has incentive to exert more effort. Once mean returns
are enhanced, both parties benifit.
2. Management Fee and the Investor’s Net-Fee Income
If we compare Panel A to Panel B, then we see that high management fees induce low
managerial effort, grant the manager with high fees and leave the investor with less
net-fee income. Moreover, even if the fund has a substantial portion of management
wealth, the investor’s expected return may still be negative.
3. Risk and Effort
As discussed in Table 1.2, when there is no management wealth, high production risk
leads to low managerial effort. However, as the manager puts personal wealth in the
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fund, the higher risk, the more effort she exerts. Therefore, allowing management
wealth is an effective means to avoid manager’s shirk of effort and extra risk taking.
Actually, management wealth is similar to a symmetric incentive fee in that it exposes
the manager to both upside and downside variation. Management wealth could be
seen as an ’unbounded’ symmetric fee.
1.3.4 Impact of HWM on Effort
Table 1.4 reports the numerical results of Model V where the manager is subject to
HWM and has previous loss to recover. Major findings are as follows,
1. Distance to Watermark and Incentive
Although HWM is designed to induce effort by linking the manager’s previous per-
formance with current compensation, as discussed in Model V, the effect is double-
fold. We see clearly in Table 1.4 how the incentive changes with the distance to
watermark. In Panel A where the manager is high-skill, we observe that in many
cases, her effort level, reflected by the average return, increases in h. However, there
are still cases, in which the effort first increases and then drops when the required
return to recover previous loss is high. The deteriorated incentive is more evident
in Panel B, where in all cases, effort decreases in h. These results correspond to the
Model V’s conclusions and confirm that HWM can align interests to a limited extent.
2. Risk, β and Effort
Since management wealth is not considered in Model V, it is not too surprising to
observe that high risk leads to low effort. Again, we see that β is a good incentive
stimulator.
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1.4 Extension to a Multi-period Model
We now consider a T-period extension of the models presented in Section 2. The con-
tract between a specific investor i and her hedge fund manager lasts for T periods, T ≥ 1.
For ease of exposition, we assume that all contractual characteristics remain the same dur-
ing the exsitence of a contract.20 In such a multi-period contract, the asset level for the
investor, the compensation for the manager and their determinants reveal themselves in
stages:
1. Initially, the investor brings her initial investment I0 to the hedge fund manager and
if the manager provides a HWM, then the threshold h0, for the manager to overcome
for the first period in order to charge an incentive fee, is automatically set to be zero.
2. There is no renegotiation and the contract s(r) or s(e) remains in effect from t = 0 to
t = T .
3. The periodic return rt during [t−1, t] is jointly determined by the managerial effort
through E[rt ] = x(et −1) and a random disturbance, εt −1, whose value will not be
realized until time t. At time t, the proceed or loss is shared between the manager and
the investor according the the contract s(r) (or (s(e))). Specifically, the manager will
receive s(r) for compensation and the investor will be left with It−1+ It−1rt − s(rt).
The investor continues to commit all her investment with no additional investment or
cash withdrawal to the same hedge fund manager21.Thus,
It = It−1(1+ rt)− s(rt) (1.38)
4. If the contract features a loss carryforwards provision (HWM) then as soon as rt
is realized, the watermark, and thus the distance to the watermark, ht can then be
20Schwarz (2007) finds that the fee structure of hedge funds is subject to very limited time-series variation.
21We do not consider walkaway options held by investors.
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determined and will be used as a benchmark for the manager’s performance next
period through the following iterative process,
ht =
 0, if rt ≥ ht−1It−1(ht−1− rt)/It), if rt < ht−1 (1.39)
5. Neither the investor nor the manager has a saving option and thus they will only
consume all wealth at the end of employment. However, the manager has T choices
of effort to make for production at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, in order to maximize her
expected utility for the rest T − t periods. Her optimization problem is thus,
U(h0) = max
{et}T−10
T
∑
t=1
γ t(
∫
u(s(rt ,ht−1))dF(rt |et)− c(et)) (1.40)
For convenience of notation, we assume that the discount rate γ = 1.
For Model I to IV, the solution to the multi-period model is identical to that to the single-
period version, since there is no intemporal interaction involved. A manager maximizes her
overall expected utility by maximizing the expected utility during each period without the
consideration for future. However, there is strong interation between periods for Model V
where the HWM is featured. The unrecovered loss is carried forward to future as reflected
by (1.39) and enters the manager’s maximization problem. Theoretically, this dynamic
programming problem can be solved through the following Bellman equation,
V (ht) = max
et+1
(
∫
u(s(rt+1,ht))dF(rt+1|et+1)− c(et+1)+ γV (ht+1)),∀t ≤ T −1 (1.41)
We do not, however, provide the solution to the Bellman function because it is too
involved and dependent on the the specification of x(e) and c(e). Nevertheless, in next
section we use simulation results to examine the relation between incentive contracts and
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managerial effort with a multi-period horizon.
1.5 Simulated Multi-Period Results
In a single-period framework, we find that HWM can either motivate or discourage ef-
fort, depending on the distance to the watermark. It is also of interest to examine how HWM
will affect a fund’s return, a manager’s compensation and an investor’s income over a multi-
year horizon. Since the use of HWM makes the compensation scheme path-dependent, we
need to implement simulation to generate samples in order to make statistical inferences.
The simulation process is as follows,
1. At t=0, each fund has a principal of $100 and the watermark is set to h=0.
2. A manager at the beginning of each period then determines her effort to exert based
on Model V. At the end of the period, the return is realized, determined by effort and
a simulated innovation. The return (or loss) is then divided between the manager and
investor. If there is any loss, the distance to watermark will be calculated, otherwise,
it is zero.
3. This procedure is then repeated for 5 and 10 times, representing a 5-year and a 10-
year horizon.
Table 1.5 reports the simulated results. We find that over multiyear horizons, HWM
funds significantly underperform No HWM funds. The reason is that once a HWM fund
experiences a huge loss, the next-period managerial effort will be greatly damaged. The
decreased effort will in turn lead to decreased average return next period, putting the fund
even deeper in the water. That is, HWM funds are very sensitive to unexpectedly huge
loss and the effort and performance is likely to deteriorate very quickly after the loss takes
place.
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We can also see from Table 1.5 that HWM provision sustantially reduces the manager’s
income since she cannot charge incentive fees before the previous loss is recovered. How-
ever, ironically, the investor does not benefit from this loss carryforward provision. On the
contrary, the investor receives significantly less income with HWM. We then draw a very
important lesson that HWM does not always induce effort and benefit the investor. HWM
should be used with caution especially when the production risk of a fund is very high.
Moreover, if a fund is too deep in the water, it is not only in the manager’s interest, but also
in the investor’s interest to reset watermark in order to regain managerial effort.
1.6 Conclusions
Compared to other investment vehicles, the hedge fund industry features its compensa-
tion schemes with a far more diverse set of contractual factors. In this paper, we focus on
incentive symmetry, management wealth, loss carryforward provision, fees and their impli-
cations on managerial effort. Basically, managerial effort is determined by the distribution
rule and the risk-sharing rule. Each contractual factor speficifies one or both. However,
these factors are closely integrated with each other in such a way that no factor has a dom-
inating influence on managerial incentive. Each factor’s impact is heavily dependent on
other factors as well as information setting, fund characteristics (e.g. size, style, liquidity
and legal strcture, etc.) and management characteristics (e.g. risk aversion, skills, cost
efficiency, investment horizon and tenure length, etc.). Although we derive some neces-
sary conditions for inducing effort, it is generally difficult to design a universally optimal
contract for managers. What makes the problem even more involved is the divergence of
optimality between the manager and the investor. However, the many difficulties open a
door for Pareto moves. That is, it is possible for each party to design innovated contracts
to enhance utility without hurting the other. There is also space for regulators to improve
social welfare through the supervision on management compensation schemes.
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CHAPTER 2
A REEXAMINATION OF HEDGE FUND
TOURNAMENT AND RISK-SHIFTING
BEHAVIOR
2.1 Introduction
It has been suggested by agency theory and widely addressed in finance literature that
asset managers have a propensity to participate in a ‘tournament game’, when their com-
pensation is associated to relative performance. For example, in their seminal work, Brown,
Harlow and Starks (1996) find that during 1976 to 1991, 334 U.S growth-oriented mutual
fund managers demonstrated ‘tournament’ behavior that mid-year underperformers took
more portfolio risk than mid-year outperformers in the following six months. One refutable
explanation is that the mutual fund market provides such a tournament environment that
mutual fund managers with comparable investment objectives compete with one another in
each assessment period (usually one calendar year) for superb performance ranking in order
to attract new capital. Moreover, mutual fund investors are very responsive to these rank-
ings (see Sirri and Tufano (1998)) in an asymmetric mode. Namely, top-ranking funds re-
ceive notably larger shares of new investment in subsequent periods, while bottom-ranking
funds do not suffer from as significant capital outflows. Therefore, those tournament com-
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petitors who fall behind peers in the middle of a tournament period have strong incentives
to manipulate risk in an aggressive manner, hoping for ending up as top performers in the
game. By and large, a tournament setting can substantially lessen the risk aversion of un-
derperforming players, especially when upside reward considerably outweighs downside
punishment. This excessive risk-taking behavior from underperformers in a tournament
has also been tested for among hedge fund managers (e.g., see Brown, Goetzmann and
Park (2001), Clare and Motson (2009) and Aragon and Nanda (2009). The hedge fund
industry has been increasingly drawing attentions from both practitioners and academics in
the recent decade mostly because of its persistent superior performance measured by either
absolute or risk-adjusted returns(e.g. see Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999),
Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Liang (1999) and Jagannathan, Malakhov and
Novikov (2010)). One defining feature that distinguishes hedge fund managers from their
mutual fund peers is that the former are expected and paid to deliver absolute positive re-
turns for clients regardless adverse market conditions or investment environments, given
the very light regulatory oversight they are subject to and the abundance of investment
tools to actively place bets, such as derivatives, leveraging and short sales that hedge fund
managers can implement at great discretion.
Besides, hedge fund and mutual fund managers have very distinct fee structures de-
signed to align interests and to provide incentives. On one hand, mutual fund managers
strive to outperform peers or investment benchmarks mandated in the prospectus in order
to attract outside investors to the existing capital pool, based on which they charge man-
agement fees. On the other hand, however, hedge fund managers’ compensation schemes
are usually more mixed, for they are composed not only by management fees, but also by,
notably, performance fees, which account for a significant portion of trading profits that
exceed a preset active investment benchmark (20% in the most prevailing 2/20 hedge fund
fee structure).
In view of the discrepancy in pay-performance relations resulting from different com-
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pensation schemes of hedge fund and mutual fund managers discussed above, we are then
motivated to reexamine the tournament behavior among hedge fund managers with the
conjecture that all hedge fund managers are not driven exclusively by relative performance
ranking when producing performance and making risk decisions.
In this paper, we only find very weak evidence, in accordance with existing literature,
that hedge fund managers participated in risk tournaments during 1994 to 2008. Our two
novel tests at fund level and strategy level, respectively, do not detect any tournament be-
havior among hedge fund managers. We attribute this finding to that hedge fund managers
are tied to relative ranking much less than mutual fund managers, while they have much
greater economic incentives to deliver absolute returns so as to charge fees. Our results
confirm that if an individual hedge fund manager’s mid-year performance does not exceed
a particular threshold (could be the hurdle rate, the historical high of NAV, or the combina-
tion of both), then she is likely to increase risk in the second half-year.
Second, our results demonstrate that hedge fund managers instead correspond to their
absolute performance strongly by changing risk at mid-year. That is, a hedge fund manager
tends to increase risk when she finds her incentive contract under the water. However, her
motive to decrease risk when she has already outperformed her own investment benchmark
is not as strong.
Third, we examine the functionality of High Water Mark (HWM hereafter), a loss carry
forward provision that has been more and more adopted by hedge funds in recent years.
Our regression results show that the HWM functions very well in restraining hedge fund
managers from taking excessive risks. One explanation is that the implementation of HWM
effectively extends the investment horizon (see Panageas and Westerfield (2009)) of hedge
fund managers and therefore rein in their short-term risk-taking behaviors such as tourna-
ment. Last, we examine the performance and flow consequences of hedge fund managers’
risk shifting. Results show that risk-shifting does not help improve either performance or
subsequent flows. Therefore, such behavior destroys value. The outline of the rest of this
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paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews existing Literature. Section 3 describes the data and
empirical models. Section 4 and 5 detail the contingency table approach and regression
approach, respectively. Section 6 examines the performance and flow consequences of risk
shifting. Section 7 provides robustness tests and Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to existing literature along the following dimensions.
The seminal work by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) find that the risk tournament
is mainly driven by the relative ranking of mutual fund managers at year end. Kempf and
Ruenzi (2008) reexamine this issue and provide supporting evidence. They also investi-
gate other driving forces of tournament and find the relative position within a mutual fund
family also matters. In a further study, Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) find that the risk
taking behaviors of mutual fund managers vary depending on whether the employment risk
or the compensation incentives prevail in a particular year. Massa and Patgiri (2009) find
evidence that high-incentive mutual fund contracts lead to higher risk taking, higher risk-
adjusted performance and persistence in outperformance though they also reduce the funds’
survival probability. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) lend empirical evidence to the rationale
of risk tournament by finding that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship can
explain the increase or decrease in the riskiness of a mutual fund. Brown, Goetzmann and
Park (2001) extend the study to hedge fund industry and find that risk shifts in hedge funds
and CTAs are associated with relative performance rather than absolute performance. They
attribute the finding to career concerns and reputation costs. Clare and Motson (2009)
address the tournament behaviors among hedge fund managers and argue that option-like
incentives drive managers’ risk taking. However, their study shows that the tournament
behaviors are dominated by lock-in behaviors, i.e. reducing the risk of a successful fund.
Aragon and Nanda (2009) investigate the same issue and conclude that tournament is pre-
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vailing mainly in the incubation period. Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999)
provide excellent insights regarding how managerial incentives of hedge fund managers
may make risk taking diverge from investors’ preferred level. Kouwenberg and Ziemba
(2007) study incentive fees and hedge fund risk taking. They document that the level of
incentive fees is positively related to excess downside risk. Within a corporate finance
framework, Coles Daniel and Naveen (2006) link higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock
volatility to riskier policy choices, which finding helps explain the relationship between in-
centives and risk-taking in hedge fund industry. Unlike most existing literature, Li (2006)
study hedge fund risk taking over two-year sample periods and find shifts in risk taking
in response to relative performance and high-water-mark. Carpenter (2000) in a theoreti-
cal paper argues that option-like incentives do not necessarily lead to greater risk seeking.
Panageas and Westerfield (2009) address that spanning a manager’s investment horizon
can effectively reduce her risk taking despite her risk appetite, pointing out a hopeful rem-
edy for the excess risk taking arising from tournament behaviors. Dass, Massa and Patgiri
(2008) report opposing results to the above literature that incentive fees reduce mutual fund
managers’ tendency to herd.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Introduction and Summary Statistics
The hedge fund data used in our empirical studies come from the Lipper TASS hedge
fund database, one of the leading hedge fund data vendors. We utilize individual hedge
fund performance and characteristic data, as well as the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices
for 10 risk styles. Since the hedge fund industry has been historically subject to very
light regulation, there are no mandatory reporting standards that hedge fund managers are
required to follow. As a result, there exists a collection of well-documented hedge fund
database biases that hedge fund researchers need to carefully cope with. For example,
47
hedge fund data may contain only information for funds that are still in operation and
lack the information for funds that are already out of business or close to new investments
(referred to as ‘survivorship bias’). Hedge fund managers may choose whether to report
to data vendors and if so, which vendor(s) to report to at utter discretion (referred to as
‘self-selection bias’). After they report to a database, managers can voluntarily provide the
data vendor with their track records, where there is no guarantee that the reported historical
performance has been audited and validated (referred to as ‘back-filling bias’). For more
detailed analyses of the impact of these biases, see Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999),
Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000) and Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008)
In view of this, we impose several screening criteria in selecting our sample in order to
minimize the influence of potential biases.
To exclude the impact of extreme returns, we winsorize the whole data at 0.01% on both
tails. To mitigate the survivorship bias, we include both the ’live funds’ and ’graveyard
funds’ reported by TASS in our sample. Our sample only covers Jan. 1994 through Dec.
2008 because ’graveyard funds’ were not recorded by Lipper TASS until 1994. Every fund
in our sample must be denominated in US dollars, report monthly returns, management
fees and incentive fees, and have complete return history for at least one calendar year.
To minimize the backfilling bias, we purge returns of the first 12 months for each hedge
fund. We also discard hedge funds whose risk strategy is labeled as Undefined, Multi-
Strategy, Other and Options Strategy, for they represent too few observations 1 to generate
meaningful statistic reference. These screening criteria result in a total sample of 7,206
hedge funds and 426,852 observations.
In the analyses that follow, we benchmark the risk-taking of each individual hedge fund
to a hedge fund index of same risk strategy. The hedge fund indices used in this paper are
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Indices USD of 10 risk styles with the same Lipper
TASS risk strategy classification. The only exception is Fund of Hedge Funds, for which
1 The three categories altogether represent only 77 funds and 2,761 observations.
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we use TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average instead. We calculate monthly returns and
mid-year risk-shifting for each index and compare them to individual hedge funds. Table
2.1 reports the summary statistics.
2.3.2 Hedge Fund Compensation Structure and Fee Incentives
In order to quantify and contrast the monetary incentives from the management fee
and performance fee, we estimate and report a collection of key variables of hedge fund
compensation structure in Table 2.2. On one hand, of all 7,206 hedge funds in our sample,
the average reported management fee accounts for 1.49% of a hedge fund’s NAV. On the
other, however, hedge fund managers do not usually report collected performance fees in
percentage of NAV. Therefore, we need to estimate this variable given incentive fee rates
provided by Lipper TASS database and some simplifying assumptions.
The difficulty in estimating the charged performance fee is at least threefold. First,
for those hedge funds that feature a HWM provision, a time series of historical high of
NAVs needs to be established. Second, investors entering a fund at different time may
have different HWM throughout their investment, in spite that a fund only reports one
unique NAV each month. Third, many hedge funds, if not all, impose that managers have
to outperform a usually passive benchmark rate, for example, the LIBOR, the one-year
T-bill rate, or the S&P 500 Index, plus a spread, before collecting any performance fees.
Unfortunately, Lipper TASS does not have a uniform data column for hurdle rates as of the
writing of this paper 2 .
We estimate the paid-out incentive fees based on the assumption that each hedge fund
has only one share class and therefore maintains only one HWM 3. For those funds that
have a HWM provision, we estimate and update the HWM at the end of each calendar year.
2Some hedge fund managers disclose their hurdles in the side notes they report to Lipper TASS database.
Interested researchers need to hand-collect this information.
3There is a prevailing corrective method called the Share Equalization Method in hedge fund industry
that enables a hedge fund to use only one high water mark to keep track of incentive fees of all share classes.
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All calculation in Table 2.2 is based on three hypothetical hurdle rates, 0%, 4% and 8%
annually, that hopefully represent the real spectrum of hurdles in the hedge fund industry 4.
A remarkable observation from Table 2.2 is that compared to the 1.49% of NAV that
management fees account for on average, paid-out incentive fees historically take up no less
than 2.26% of investors’ asset each year. This difference is statistically and economically
significant. In later sections, we are dedicated to investigating whether the monetary in-
centives from the combination of two fees have shaped hedge fund managers’ risk-shifting
behavior differently from mutual fund managers, who feed on only one flat asset-based fee.
Other evidence demonstrated in Table 2.2 includes that hedge funds on average spend
a rather lengthy time under the high water during a calendar year. Therefore, whether
they can beat their own benchmark (the HWM, the hurdle or the combination of the two)
and savor the incentive fee shall have meaningful impact on hedge fund managers’ pay-
performance relation in a year. Besides, if we consider the incentive fee as a series of
European call options with one year expiration granted to hedge fund managers, Table 2.2
illustrates that the options are on average at the money in mid-years, where the first deriva-
tive of option value with respect to volatility (The Greek Vega) is maximum, according to
the Black Scholes option pricing model. From a stand-alone point of view, regardless of
career reputation and liquidation threats, a hedge fund manager holding such at-the-money
options have economic incentives to increase risk at mid-year for her own benefit. This ra-
tionale partially explains the overall positive risk-shifting at mid-years among hedge fund
managers across all risk styles, as reflected in Table 2.1.
Thus far, we have depicted a sketch picture for the incentives from the two fees. We
suspect that hedge fund managers are all willing to play tournament game to increase man-
agement fee, for the incentive from the performance-based fee is at least as strong. We
conjecture that rational hedge fund managers shall balance the two incentives in making
risk-shifting decisions. In the following section, we attempt to confirm our conjecture by
4Anecdotal evidence shows that the occurrence of a hurdle rate outside the 0%-8% range is rather rare.
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reexamining the tournament behavior of hedge fund managers.
2.4 Contingency Table Analyses
A contingency table test is suitable for detecting the mutual dependence between two
random variables. With respect to tournament behaviors, contingency table analyses are
used to test whether mid-year losers tend to increase their portfolio risk in the second half
year. In BHS’s work, mid-year losers among mutual fund managers are identified based
on the ranking of their accumulated returns over the first half calendar year. The bottom
50% of mutual fund managers are defined as mid-year losers and the top 50% as mid-year
winners. The risk-shifting between the first and second half year for fund i is captured by
RAR (the risk adjustment ratio) defined as follows,
RARi =
σ1,i
σ2,i
(2.1)
Where σ1,i and σ2,i are the standard deviation of fund returns over the first and second
half year, respectively. All RARs within a risk style are then ranked and a fund that has
an RAR above/below the median is defined as a high RAR/ low RAR fund. A contin-
gency table then allocates to 2x2=4 cells the proportion of funds that corresponds to loser
& high RAR, loser & low RAR, winner & high RAR and winner & low RAR. The tour-
nament theory predicts that mid-year losers have greater incentives than mid-year winners
to boost performance ranking by aggressively increase risk taking in the second half year.
Therefore, without the presence of tournament behavior, both mid-year winners and losers
should have equal tendency to increase or decrease their risk and the corresponding cells in
the contingency table should not be statistically different.
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2.4.1 BHS and BGP Tests for Tournament
We first replicate the contingency table methodology in BHS(Brown, Harlow and Starks
(1996))’s seminal work for mutual funds and BGP(Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001))’s
test for tournament for hedge funds CTAs on our sample data and report the results in Table
2.3. In this table, we test for the existence of tournament among hedge fund managers
driven by incentives from both relative ranking and absolute performance. Incentives from
relative performance refer to the relative ranking with peer mangers, while those from
absolute performance are related to whether a hedge fund under management is currently
below a High Water Mark (HWM)5.
Panel A reports the contingency table conducted on the whole data sample that covers a
15-year time period from Jan. 1994 to Dec. 2008. The one-degree-of-freedom Chi-squared
statistic of 35.50 rejects the null hypothesis that there is no tournament behavior driven by
relative performance. The result indicates that on average, hedge fund managers respond
to mid-year underperformance by taking relatively higher risk than style peers. However,
by contrast, hedge fund managers that have not recovered previous loss by mid years do
not significantly take on riskier portfolio management in the second half year.
Panel B details the contingency table analyses for each calendar year from 1994 to 2008.
Out of the 15 years, tournament behavior driven by relative performance is significant at
1% confidence level in 9 years, lending support for the consistency of tournament behavior
in the recently one decade and half. By contrast, only in 3 years can we find evident
tournament behavior that is driven by absolute performance.
Panel C exhibits how tournament behavior prevails in different risky strategies of hedge
funds. The result shows that 5 out of 11 strategies demonstrate risk tournament of relative
performance over the sample period, while only three strategies participate in risk tourna-
5An alternative version of tournament behavior other than that in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) is
first proposed by Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), who argue that if a hedge fund is below its HWM,
as a result the manager would worry that she cannot charge incentive fees at year end, then she has greater
incentives to inflate risk in the second half year in hope that the fund will exceed the HWM at year end.
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ment driven by absolute performance. In accordance with Aragon and Nanda (2009), in
Panel D we find that tournament is more evident during the incubation period of a hedge
fund than after the hedge fund is added to TASS database,
2.4.2 Additional Contingency Table Tests
1. Fund-level Test
The estimate of half-year standard deviation for each fund is based on the 6 observa-
tions of month-end returns that are reported by TASS database and therefore has substantial
estimation errors. The true return-generating process of a hedge fund is almost continuous.
However, unlike U.S mutual funds, the hedge fund industry is not required by regulation or
law to disclose performance to public on a daily basis. Therefore, the true return-generating
process of a hedge fund is secretive to outside investors. Mainstream hedge fund databases
record hedge fund performance on a monthly basis and as a result, we are only able to
collect at most 12 sample points in a year for a hedge fund and use them to estimate the
population standard deviation for each half year. The measurement error is further ampli-
fied when we divide the standard deviation of the first half year by that of the second. As an
effort to cope with the estimation error problem, we use the Brown and Forsythe (1974)’s
nonparametric test for homogeneity of variance to form a subsample of data that is only
composed of those fund-years in which a manager significantly shift risk between the first
and the second half-years.
The Brown and Forsythe’s nonparametric test is a statistical technique that is originated
from the Levene test for heterogeneity in variance. It calculates this absolute deviation
from the sample median for each observation, and then uses ANOVA to test whether the
means of this quantity are the same for all of the populations. The Brown and Forsythe’s
test does not require parametric assumptions about the underlying probability distributions
of the two populations in comparison. The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are
as following,
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H0 : σ1,i = σ2,i
H1 : σ1,i 6= σ2,i (2.2)
We then conduct this test on each fund and retain those fund-years that reject the above
null hypothesis at a significance level of 10%. As a result, the sample size declines to
2545 fund-years, since the rest fund-years do not demonstrate statistically significant risk-
shifting between the first and second half-years. Table 2.3 reports the results of the fund-
level test in which we find little evidence of tournament behavior when monthly returns are
used to measure risk shifting.
2.Strategy-level Test
Another limitation of the original contingency table test is that the excess risk-taking is
defined in relative terms. For example, In BHS and BGP, second half-year risk-takers are
defined as managers whose standard deviation ratios are below the median. Risk shifting
of mid-year underperformers is found more aggressive than peers. However, this finding
does not indicate whether the risk taking behavior is actually intensified due to the mid-
year underperformance. For example, a hedge fund that has a risk ratio of 0.8 may have
been found an excess risk-taker in a tournament, only because the average risk ratio is
0.75, despite that in fact the manager reduces her risk in the second half-year. The distinc-
tion between relative and absolute risk-shifting has critical economic implication from an
investor’s perspective. Compared to absolute risk-shifting, relative risk-shifting may not
indeed increase the risk level of investors’ capital. In view of the above, we next conduct
another innovative test for tournament, requiring the median risk ratio of a risk strategy for
a particular calendar year is either significantly greater or smaller than 1. We are mostly
interested in finding out whether mid-year underperformers increase portfolio risk in the
second half-year when on average style peers choose to reduce risk. If such behavior is
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detected, then it lends strong evidence to tournament theory.
The median RAR of each risk style is also subject to measurement error and as a result
we cannot compare it directly to 1 to determine whether a risk style as a whole has a ten-
dency to increase or decrease risk in a particular calendar year. We then use bootstrapping
technique to determine the confidence interval for the median RAR of each risk style for
each calendar year. If the lower bound of the confidence interval is higher than 1, then
this risk style in this year is identified as risk seeking’; if the upper bound of the confidence
interval is lower than 1, then this risk style in this year is identified as risk budgeting’. Boot-
strapping is a nonparametric re-sampling technique and does not require any distributional
assumptions about the median RAR. It is very useful especially when the assumption of
normality does not hold and when we need to make inferences on a non-linear combination
of variables, such as a ratio. We employ 10000 replications in bootstrapping each risk style
for each year. Out of the 171 style-years, 57 style-years are classified as risk seeking’ and
41 style-years are classified as risk budgeting’. We now constrain our sample in the risk
budgeting’ category and conduct another contingency table test for tournament. The results
are reported in Table 2.4. We find that tournament behavior is rarely present in data. The
results indicate that the tournament behaviors among hedge fund managers are dominated
by relative rather than absolute risk taking.
In all, contingency table analyses provide very weak evidence that hedge fund risk shift-
ing between the first and second half year is motivated by mid-year relative performance.
In the next section, we perform regression analyses to further investigate the factors that
affect the risk taking behavior of hedge fund managers.
2.5 Multivariate Regression Analyses
In this section, we use multivariate regression models to detect what factors, if not
tournament, drive hedge fund managers’ risk shifting decisions in the middle of a year.
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Panel data of 12 hedge fund risk styles from 1994 through 2008 are used in all regressions
and the dependent variable is the change in standard deviation of a hedge fund between the
two halves of a calendar year.
∆σi = σ2,i−σ1,i (2.3)
2.5.1 Control Variables
Given the property of the panel data in use, we include year dummies and risk style
dummies to account for both the time and style fixed effects. Besides, we also adopt the
following variables as controls,
1. Vix, The average of CBOE VIX Index in the first half of each calendar year, and
∆Vix, the semi-annual change of Vix. These two variables control for market risk and its
mid-year shifting.
2. σ Index j · I j, standard deviation of the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index for risk style
j, and its change between two year halves, ∆σ Index j · I j. These two variables control for
style-specific risk and its mid-year shifting.
3.σ1,i, is six-month lagged standard deviation of the same fund to control for the mag-
nitude of individual fund’s risk taking.
4. IHWM, is a High Water Mark dummy. It is included as control because interactive
terms of this variable will be examined as experimental variables.
2.5.2 Experimental Variables
Of central interest in the paper is whether a hedge fund’s risk-shifting decision is driven
by relative or absolute performance, or both. Therefore, we include the following explana-
tory variables in regression models to test for their linear relations to individual hedge
funds’ mid-year risk shifting.
1. Ranki,t , is the ranking of cumulative returns as of the end of June in year t of hedge
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fund i within risk style. Rankings close to 0% represent bottom performers, and to 100%,
top performers. If hedge fund managers play tournament games, then the coefficient should
be significantly positive.
2. AbsIncentive, equal to Moneyness× Incentive f ee, is a hedge fund’s moneyness at
the end of June, as defined previously, scaled by its incentive fee rate. This variable mea-
sures the monetary motivation from absolute performance. Higher incentive fees imply
stronger drives. We conjecture that positive moneyness leads to profit lock-in and there-
fore reduced risk, while negative moneyness results in excessive risk-taking and therefore
increased volatility.
3. In order to investigate the impact of the positive and negative absolute performance
on risk-shifting, respectively, we decompose the variable AbsIncentive into two parts, and
use them as separate explanatory variables.
AbsIncentive+ = max{AbsIncentive,0} ≥ 0 (2.4)
AbsIncentive− = min{AbsIncentive,0} ≤ 0 (2.5)
By definition, these two variables add up to AbsIncentive itself.
4. We include two interaction terms, IHWM ·AbsIncentive+ and IHWM ·AbsIncentive−
to examine the influence that the HWM provision exerts on hedge fund managers’ risk
shifting decisions.
2.5.3 Panel Regression Models
Model (1):
∆σ ji,t = α+β ·Ranki,t+ γ1 ·Vixt+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ
Index j
t · I j (2.6)
+ γ4 ·∆σ Index jt · I j+ γ5 ·σ1,i,t+∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
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Model (1) tests for the linear relation between the change in risk of individual funds at
mid-year and their performance ranking among style peers, after controlling for risk-taking
and risk-shifting at economy level, strategy level and fund level.
Model (2):
∆σ ji,t = α+β ·AbsIncentivei,t+ γ1 ·Vixt+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ
Index j
t · I j (2.7)
+ γ4 ·∆σ Index jt · I j+ γ5 ·σ1,i,t+∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
Model (2) tests for the linear relation between the change in risk of individual funds
at mid-year and their absolute performance incentive measure, after controlling for risk-
taking and risk-shifting at economy level, strategy level and fund level.
Model (3):
∆σ ji,t = α+β1 ·Ranki,t+β2 ·AbsIncentivei,t+ γ1 ·Vixt+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ
Index j
t · I j(2.8)
+ γ4 ·∆σ Index jt · I j+ γ5 ·σ1,i,t+∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
Model (3) include both relative rankings and absolute performance incentive measure,
after controlling for risk-taking and risk-shifting at economy level, strategy level and fund
level.
Model (4):
∆σ ji,t = α+β1 ·Ranki,t+β2 ·AbsIncentive+i,t+β3 ·AbsIncentive−i,t
+ γ1 ·Vixt+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ Index jt · I j+ γ4 ·∆σ Index jt · I j (2.9)
+ γ5 ·σ1,i,t+∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
Model (4) distinguishes whether a hedge fund is above or under the high water at mid-
year, after controlling for risk-taking and risk-shifting at economy level, strategy level and
fund level.
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Model (5):
∆σ ji,t = α+β1 ·Ranki,t+β2 ·AbsIncentive+i,t+β3 ·AbsIncentive−i,t
+ β4 ·AbsIncentive+i,t · IHWM+β5 ·AbsIncentive−i,t · IHWM
+ γ1 ·Vixt+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ Index jt · I j+ γ4 ·∆σ Index jt · I j+ γ5 ·σ1,i,t (2.10)
+ γ6 · IHWM+∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
In addition to Model (4), Model (5) contains two interaction variables between the
HWM dummy and absolute performance incentive measure.
2.5.4 Regression Results
Table 2.5 reports the regression results of the above five models. All regressions are
conducted at the hurdle rate of 4%. All tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors
and diagnostic analyses do not detect mutlilinearity and serial correlation.
Among control variables, the change in risk of VIX and style-specific indices both
demonstrate positive and significant coefficients across all models, implying that individ-
ual hedge fund managers’ risk-shifting decisions are remarkably influenced by market con-
dition and style peers. Also, risk-shifting is mean reverting, based on the significantly
negative coefficient of individual funds’ lagged risk.
It can be observed from Model (1) that when performance ranking alone is considered
as an explanatory variable, its coefficient is negative and significant, indicating tournament
behavior of hedge fund managers. This result is consistent with the contingency table
test in Table 2.3 and partially explains why existing literature has documented hedge fund
tournament.
Results of Model (2) exhibit that when absolute performance measure is examined
alone, its coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that when a hedge fund is under
the water at mid-year, the manager tends to increase risk and when the fund is above the
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water, the manager tends to decease risk.
Model (3) contains both the relative and absolute performance measures and regres-
sion results show that regarding risk-shifting, the motivation from absolute performance
dominates that from relative performance, for the coefficient of Moneyness*Ifee remains
negative and significant, while the coefficient of relative ranking loses its statistic signifi-
cance.
Model (4) is designed to detect whether mid-year risk-shifting decisions of hedge fund
managers are more responsive to underperformance or outperformance relative to mangers’
own benchmark (HWM, hurdle, or both). Results illustrate that underperforming hedge
fund managers eagerly take risk and somewhat surprisingly, outperforming managers do
not tend to decrease risk to lock in profits and fees. However, the risk-taking on the upside
is much more moderate than on the downside.
Model (5) examines whether HWM has any meaningful impact on hedge fund man-
agers’ risk-shifting decisions by including interaction terms in the regression model. Inter-
estingly, HWM does rein in excessive risk taking when a fund is under the water. On one
hand, an underperforming hedge fund with a HWM takes 12 percentage points less risk
than an underperforming hedge fund without one, about one-third less risky than the lat-
ter. On the other hand, however, HWM does not significantly affect already outperforming
hedge funds.
In the above regression analyses, some unique features of hedge fund risk-shifting have
been revealed. First, hedge fund managers respond to absolute performance more promi-
nently than to relative ranking. Second, hedge fund managers respond to downside absolute
performance more drastically than to upside absolute performance. Third, HWM functions
well in reining in excessive risk-taking on the downside, while having no meaningful im-
pact on the upside.
While the above regression analyses reveal significant relation between hedge funds’
mid-year risk-shifting and hedge fund managers’ incentive from option-like fees, some
60
embedded non-linearity may not be readily unveiled by such linear regressions. We next
use sorted portfolios to further study the binary relation between fee incentives and risk-
shifting behaviors from a different perspective.
2.6 Performance and Flow Consequences of Risk Taking
In this section, we examine whether mid-year risk-shifting has any implication for sub-
sequent performance and capital flows.
Within each risk strategy in a particular year, we sort individual hedge funds, according
to their mid-year risk taking, into quintiles and obtain 5 x 11=55 portfolios. We compute
the equally-weighted average of risk-shifting, change in half-year cumulative returns and
change in moneyness between two year halves for each portfolio. We report the results in
Table 2.6.
Table 2.6 shows that, in general, mid-year risk shifting does not improve post-shifting
performance. Specifically, in 9 out of 11 risk strategies, Portfolio 1 (the most aggressive risk
takers) result in the worst post-shifting performance, except for Dedicated Short Bias and
Managed Futures. Besides, in 7 out of 11 risk strategies, Portfolio 1 (the most aggressive
risk takers) result in the worst improvement in the moneyness of fund manager incentive
contracts, except for Dedicated Short Bias, Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge and
Managed Futures. We therefore conclude that aggressive risk taking on average does not
create value for hedge fund investors nor improve the personal compensation of hedge fund
managers. Thus, it should not be a consequence of long-run market equilibrium, but rather
reflects ill-aligned interest caused by short-term incentives. This finding is in line with
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2010), who find that the most actively risk-shifting mutual funds
have the poorest post-shifting performance and they attribute this issue to agency problems.
We also compute the equally-weighted average of risk-shifting, change in cumulative
net investor cash flows and between year halves and change in net investor cash flows
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measured in percentage of year-beginning AUM. We report the results in Table 2.76.
Table 2.7 shows that Portfolio 1 (the most aggressive risk takers) in all risk strategies
results in less net cash inflows post-shifting than the first year half. Besides in 9 out of
11 risk strategies, Portfolio 1 (the most aggressive risk takers) results in deteriorated net
cash inflows measured in percentage. We therefore conclude that aggressive risk taking on
average does not attract outside capital nor increases the size of capital pool.
2.7 Robustness Checks
2.7.1 Alternative Model Specification
We perform the following checks to ensure the robustness of our results.
(1) Alter the specification of the dependent variable in the multivariate regression mod-
els.
We use the change in tracking error to replace the change in standard deviation, assum-
ing that a hedge fund’s active benchmark is the index return of the same risk strategy. That
is,
∆σTEi = σ
TE
2,i −σTE1,i (2.11)
where
σTEj,i =
√
E[ri,t− rIndexi,t ]2 (2.12)
(2)Control for liquidity shocks
Since hedge funds as a group take on remarkably high level of liquidity risk and serve
6Many hedge funds do not routinely report to Lipper TASS database their AUM on a monthly basis. As a
result, we have to purge about one third of observations that do not have a positive AUM number. Therefore,
the number of observations in each portfolio within the same risk strategy in Table 2.7 generally does not
equal.
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as a provider of liquidity to the market, (see, e.g. Teo (2010), Sadka (2009) and Cao,
Chen, Liang and Lo (2009)) , they are, therefore, inevitably subject to the so-called ’liq-
uidity spiral’, especially during adverse market liquidity shocks (see Boyson, Stahel and
Stulz (2010) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). That is, when facing adverse fund-
ing liquidity shocks during crises, hedge funds usually decrease their leverage and meet
redemption requirements by selling the most liquid assets.Such sale will reduce a hedge
fund’s ability to provide liquidity to the market and as a result, will tighten market liquidity
on aggregate. The shrinking market liquidity, in turn, will intensify the liquidity squeeze
and further reduce the value of the illiquid asset holdings of hedge funds. If strong enough,
the liquidity spiral can dry out the funding liquidity and the market value of holding port-
folios of a hedge fund very fast, resulting in unintentionally changed total risk. In order
to exclude the alternative explanation from adverse liquidity shocks, we include the con-
trol variable ∆log(AUM) in the multivariate regression models introduced in Section 4 to
account for the potential influence of the ’liquidity spiral’ on risk changing.
(3)Alternative hurdle rates.
We use the three-month T-bill rate to replace the previously used fixed hurdle rate and
to capture the variation of hurdle rates used to benchmark hedge fund managers through
time.
Table 2.8 reports the results. We observe that compared to Table 2.5, Table 2.8 does
not display notable differences on the sign, magnitude and significance of regression co-
efficients. We still observe that the incentive of risk taking is much stronger from under-
performance of benchmark than from outperformance of benchmark. Also, HWM reduces
about one third of risk-taking induced from downside performance. Besides, the change in
size control variable has a negative and significant coefficient for all five models, indicating
that decease in size explains increase in measured risk. However, our main results still hold
after controlling for change in size.
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2.7.2 Sorted Portfolios by Relative Performance
We first sort all individual hedge funds in sample, according to their relative perfor-
mance ranking within risk style at mid-year, into quintiles and obtain 5 x 11=55 portfolios.
We then compute the equally-weighted average of risk-shifting, half-year cumulative return
and moneyness for each portfolio. Results are reported in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.1.
If tournament is present among hedge funds, then we shall expect to observe decreas-
ing risk-shifting from worst performers’ portfolios through to best performers’ portfolios.
In Table 2.9, however, such trend is not present. To the contrary, 9 out of 11 hedge fund
strategies (with the exception of Managed Futures and Fixed Income Arbitrage), demon-
strate some reverse-U shape of risk-shifting with respect to performance ranking. That is,
neither top nor bottom performers, but rather some medium performers, change risk the
most dramatically at mid-year. Figure I visualizes the reverse-U shape in a more evident
manner.
This finding is key to understanding the drive for hedge fund managers’ risk-shifting
behaviors. The reverse-U shape that cannot be explained by tournament behavior resem-
bles the bell curve of Vega, the first derivative of a European call option with respect to
its volatility. In other words, a hedge fund manager has the strongest economic drive to
increase risk when her own incentive contract, which can be considered as a long Euro-
pean call with a strike of historical high, is currently at the money. Our empirical evidence
supports this explanation for 9 out of 11 risk strategies except for 2 fixed-income related
strategies (Fixed Income Arbitrage and Managed Futures). Most portfolios that shift risk at
mid-year in the most aggressive manner have moneyness around 0, according to Table 2.9.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provide a variety of contingency table and multivariate regression
analyses on the risk tournament behaviors of hedge fund managers and their risk-shifting
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decision making in response to relative performance, absolute performance and other fac-
tors.
The findings in these analyses shed light on understanding the relation between man-
agerial compensation, incentives and risk taking among the hedge fund industry along the
following aspects.
(1) Hedge funds do not exhibit strong collective risk tournament behaviors driven by
relative performance ranking because unlike mutual fund managers, hedge fund managers’
compensation incentives do not solely come from attracting outside capital and charging
flat fees on an increasing basis. In addition, hedge fund managers have strong incentives
to enter the profit-sharing zone because of the lucrative 2-20 fee structure. Therefore, the
combined incentives to beat peers and to outperform the past affect hedge fund managers’
risk-changing decisions in a more profound way.
(2) On aggregate, hedge fund managers seem to respond to absolute underperformance
more actively than to relative underperformance when making risk-taking decisions.
(3) Downside performance provides much greater incentives for hedge fund managers
to increase risk than upside performance does mainly due to the different slopes of the
pay-performance curve on the downside and upside. An economic implication is that if the
upside reward is restricted and the downside performance results in punishment, then the
excess risk-taking can be hopefully reduced.
(4) The HWM functions well in reining in excess risk-taking. One explanation is that
HWM extends a manager’s investment horizon and by Panageas and Westerfield (2009), a
prolonged horizon can effectively lessen the manager’s risk appetite.
(5) Risk shifting does not bring either performance or cash inflows. Reducing the sen-
sitivity of hedge fund managers’ pay to their absolute performance could be one remedy
for such value-deteriorating behavior.
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Table 2.6 Subsequent Performance after Risk-Shifting 
This table reports the second-half-year cumulative return, year-end moneyness and change in risk, 
cumulative returns and moneyness between two halves of a calendar year for 5 equally-weight 
hedge fund portfolios in each risk strategy. Portfolios are formed by ranking each individual 
hedge fund’s risk taking at mid-year. Portfolio 1 contains most aggressive risk takers and 
Portfolio 5 contains least aggressive takers each risk strategy. The moneyness of each portfolio is 
estimated by assuming the hurdle rate is 4%. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Convertible Arbitrage ∆Risk 2.98 0.38 -0.04 -0.35 -1.47 
 Return -3.94 4.52 3.83 3.89 3.72 
 ∆Moneyness -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Dedicated Short Bias ∆Risk 5.28 1.71 0.59 -0.43 -3.82 
 Return 1.34 5.16 1.19 3.18 0.76 
 ∆Moneyness 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 
Emerging Markets ∆Risk 6.04 1.41 0.08 -1.13 -4.48 
 Return -10.65 4.59 5.78 7.04 10.01 
 ∆Moneyness -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.15 
Equity Market Neutral ∆Risk 2.08 0.50 0.04 -0.37 -1.76 
 Return 1.98 2.59 3.24 3.58 3.88 
 ∆Moneyness 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Event Driven ∆Risk 2.74 0.63 0.11 -0.27 -1.81 
 Return -3.07 3.52 4.34 4.84 6.00 
 ∆Moneyness -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 
Fixed Income Arbitrage ∆Risk 3.34 0.48 0.07 -0.17 -1.36 
 Return -5.55 4.48 4.08 4.21 5.36 
 ∆Moneyness -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Fund of Hedge Funds ∆Risk 2.32 0.61 0.11 -0.30 -1.71 
 Return -0.43 2.18 2.58 3.36 2.97 
 ∆Moneyness 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Global Macro ∆Risk 3.40 1.00 0.04 -0.80 -3.22 
 Return 3.85 4.17 6.10 4.56 5.56 
 ∆Moneyness 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Long/Short Equity 
Hedge 
∆Risk 
4.15 1.05 0.13 -0.74 -3.58 
 Return 2.94 5.02 4.34 4.80 5.96 
 ∆Moneyness 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 
Managed Futures ∆Risk 5.03 1.44 0.19 -1.00 -4.18 
 Return 11.27 6.18 4.35 4.90 5.02 
 ∆Moneyness 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Multi-Strategy ∆Risk 3.33 0.76 0.12 -0.33 -1.96 
 Return -0.46 2.57 4.33 3.51 5.84 
 ∆Moneyness 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 
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Table 2.7 Subsequent Cash Flows after Risk-Shifting 
This table reports change in cash flows between two year halves measured in both million U.S 
dollars and percentage of year-beginning NAV for 5 equally-weight hedge fund portfolios in each 
risk strategy. Portfolios are formed by ranking each individual hedge fund’s risk taking at mid-
year. Portfolio 1 contains most aggressive risk takers and Portfolio 5 contains least aggressive 
takers each risk strategy.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
All Funds N 4460 4360 4320 4406 4465 
 ∆Risk 3.17 0.97 0.19 -0.52 -2.58 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -1.27 -1.51 -1.68 -1.60 -1.54 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -0.8% -0.4% -0.4% 0.2% 0.7% 
Convertible Arbitrage N 145 156 153 164 138 
 ∆Risk 2.44 0.56 0.13 -0.18 -1.46 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -3.70 0.08 -1.13 -2.64 -2.51 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -2.1% -0.9% 0.2% 0.9% -2.1% 
Dedicated Short Bias N 28 39 32 28 28 
 ∆Risk 4.87 2.29 0.48 -0.49 -4.16 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -2.18 0.20 0.25 0.14 -0.99 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -5.5% -1.3% -4.5% 5.0% -9.1% 
Emerging Markets N 318 298 263 286 290 
 ∆Risk 4.54 1.72 0.35 -0.93 -4.22 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -1.65 -0.25 -0.81 -1.15 -1.97 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) 0.9% -1.8% -0.9% 0.9% -0.3% 
Equity Market Neutral N 203 242 228 225 232 
 ∆Risk 1.87 0.52 0.09 -0.38 -1.61 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -1.91 -2.14 -1.91 -0.56 -0.35 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -3.0% 0.9% -2.2% -0.9% -1.6% 
Event Driven N 403 394 392 411 396 
 ∆Risk 2.27 0.75 0.26 -0.14 -1.73 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -1.07 -1.41 -0.97 -2.57 -1.41 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -0.9% 0.9% -2.2% 1.4% 3.4% 
Fixed Income Arbitrage N 188 203 204 208 198 
 ∆Risk 2.68 0.74 0.20 -0.13 -1.25 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -3.48 -8.33 -1.01 0.54 0.05 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) 0.5% -0.4% 3.4% 2.0% 1.0% 
Fund of Hedge Funds N 895 909 884 927 884 
 ∆Risk 1.87 0.56 0.22 -0.20 -1.41 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -1.67 -1.62 -3.30 -1.94 -1.37 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -1.0% -0.6% -2.1% -0.1% -0.7% 
Global Macro N 178 181 181 184 210 
 ∆Risk 3.28 0.98 0.10 -0.72 -3.30 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -3.88 -3.26 -3.53 -1.18 -13.04 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -3.0% 1.0% -0.2% 2.5% -0.9% 
Long/Short Equity Hedge N 1379 1241 1305 1336 1390 
 ∆Risk 3.80 1.11 0.11 -0.79 -3.21 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -0.47 -0.84 -0.80 -1.01 -0.89 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -0.7% -0.3% 0.5% -0.7% 1.8% 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Managed Futures N 470 443 432 425 450 
 ∆Risk 4.64 1.50 0.24 -0.96 -3.94 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) -1.16 -1.49 -1.46 -2.32 -1.01 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) -0.8% -1.2% 0.6% 0.3% 2.5% 
       
Multi-Strategy N 253 254 246 212 249 
 ∆Risk 2.84 0.90 0.31 -0.25 -1.92 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in $ Mil.) 1.19 -0.08 -2.65 -4.17 1.36 
 ∆ Cash Flows(in %) 1.2% -1.2% 0.3% 0.2% -1.7% 
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Table 2.9 Sorted Portfolios by Relative Performance 
This table reports the change in risk, cumulative return and moneyness for 5 equally-weight 
hedge fund portfolios in each risk strategy. Portfolios are formed by ranking each individual 
hedge fund’s performance within a calendar year with strategy peers. Portfolio 1 contains bottom 
performers and Portfolio 5 contains top performers for each risk strategy. The moneyness of each 
portfolio is estimated by assuming the hurdle rate is 4%. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Convertible Arbitrage ∆Risk 0.13 0.22 0.29 0.45 0.35 
 Return -1.49 2.25 4.30 6.56 14.47 
 Moneyness -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 
Dedicated Short Bias ∆Risk 0.07 0.90 1.19 0.97 -0.03 
 Return -12.32 -4.18 -0.05 4.43 14.23 
 Moneyness -0.29 -0.20 -0.20 -0.18 0.00 
Emerging Markets ∆Risk 0.54 0.51 0.64 0.49 -0.28 
 Return -9.43 1.02 6.41 13.20 33.16 
 Moneyness -0.18 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.22 
Equity Market Neutral ∆Risk 0.12 0.25 0.14 0.10 -0.10 
 Return -3.34 1.54 4.01 6.82 13.99 
 Moneyness -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 
Event Driven ∆Risk 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.34 -0.15 
 Return -1.39 3.17 5.41 8.16 18.51 
 Moneyness -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.12 
Fixed Income Arbitrage ∆Risk 0.72 0.58 0.38 0.53 0.14 
 Return -3.21 2.32 4.27 6.36 13.22 
 Moneyness -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 
Fund of Hedge Funds ∆Risk 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.11 
 Return -2.74 2.07 3.83 5.54 10.94 
 Moneyness -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 
Global Macro ∆Risk 0.26 0.44 0.38 0.02 -0.74 
 Return -8.69 -0.55 3.16 7.42 18.06 
 Moneyness -0.17 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.12 
Long/Short Equity Hedge ∆Risk 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.16 -0.19 
 Return -8.03 1.34 5.41 9.85 23.05 
 Moneyness -0.17 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.16 
Managed Futures ∆Risk 0.98 0.59 0.32 0.04 -0.30 
 Return -10.73 -1.16 3.51 8.60 22.51 
 Moneyness -0.18 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.17 
Multi-Strategy ∆Risk 0.45 0.35 0.49 0.45 0.14 
 Return -4.57 2.29 4.43 7.29 16.24 
 Moneyness -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.09 
 
 
CHAPTER 3
RISK-SHIFTING, CONTRACTUAL
INCENTIVES AND ADVERSE SELECTION
OF HEDGE FUND MANAGERS
3.1 Introduction
The theory of contracts, a strand of the agency theory, suggests that when an agent’s
effort is not fully observable to the principal and when there is much randomness in the pro-
duction process, it is better for the principal to present the agent a compensation scheme
that shares both profits and production risks, than providing him with a fixed amount of
pay. This view can, at least partly, explain the prevailing fee structure of hedge fund man-
agers.Unlike their mutual fund peers, whose main source of income, the management fee,
is based on the size of the capital pool under management, hedge fund managers have a
more mixed fee contract. They do not only charge the flat management fee to compensate
trading costs and overhead costs, most, if not all hedge fund managers, can also harvest a
non-trivial portion of trading in excess of a pre-set active investment benchmark.1
Defined as private investment vehicles and at the cost of being forbidden from public ad-
1The most popular hedge fund sharing rule used to be 2/20, 2% management fees and 20% incentive
fees. Recent years, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, have witnessed a trend of shrinking the 2/20
structure to 1/10 or 1.5/10.
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vertisement, hedge funds, on the other hand, enjoy very loose regulatory oversight and very
limited disclosure obligation. While during and after the 2008 financial crisis, the hedge
fund industry has been increasingly scrutinized and questioned on their role played in the
crisis, many hedge fund managers have argued that the lack of informational transparency
to outsiders and even to own investors is in the interest of protecting their proprietary trad-
ing strategies .2 From the viewpoint of the agency theory, the incentive contracts specific
to hedge fund managers, are such designed to reward asset managers for their proprietary
trading skills and also to share production uncertainty between investors and managers.
The positive relation between incentive contracts and investment alphas has been well
documented in hedge fund literature. In this paper, we are dedicated to examining whether
such incentive contracts also function well regarding hedge fund manager intra-year risk
shifting decisions.
We first use factor models to explain the variability of hedge fund monthly returns and
then utilize optimal change-point regressions to capture intra-year risk dynamics of hedge
fund managers. With some bootstrapping technique, we are then able to identify a subset
of hedge fund managers that statistically significantly change their risk exposures during a
calendar year. Next, we rank those risk-shifting hedge fund managers by their subsequent
risk-adjusted performance after changing risk and categorize each manager into ’informed’,
’uninformed’ or ’misinformed’ groups.
We are most interested in detecting the difference of risk shifting behavior in response
to a hedge fund manager’s own incentive contract among each group. Multivariate panel
regression results show that ’informed’ hedge fund managers exhibit the least sensitivity
of risk shifting to their incentive contracts, while ’misinformed’ hedge fund managers ex-
hibit the most aggressive risk taking and risk shifting behavior in response to personal
compensation. These results imply the problem of ’adverse selection’ in hedge fund in-
2Glode and Green (2011) in their theoretical model describes a setting in which hedge fund managers
sacrifice trading profits to avoid information spillovers that may lead to increased competition and therefore
deteriorated returns.
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dustry, i.e., incentive contracts induce the strongest risk taking from the least informed or
least skilled hedge fund managers, whose risk-shifting decisions ex post result in the most
undesired risk-adjusted returns for investors. We also find that the three groups of risk
shifting managers respond differently to incentive contracts in changing their total, beta
and idiosyncratic risks.
According to the agency theory, ’adverse selection’ takes place when there exists severe
asymmetry of information. We then reexamine this problem among a collection of hedge
funds that refutably suffer the least asymmetry of information—funds of hedge funds, and
find that the ’adverse selection’ problem is much less evident.
Last, we investigate whether the HWM(hereafter HWM), a loss carry-forward provision
in the incentive contract of many hedge fund managers, plays a positive role in mitigating
excessive risk taking and aligning interests. We conclude from empirical results that its
influence is limited.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature.
Section 3 describes the hedge fund data retrieved from the Lipper TASS database. Section 4
details the optimal change-point regression methodology for identifying risk shifting hedge
funds. Section 5 provide evidence of the problem of ’adverse selection’. In Section 6, we
conduct robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to existing literature along the following dimensions.
3.2.1 Hedge Fund Performance and Incentive Contracts
A rich body of research has related the superior performance the hedge fund indus-
try has delivered in recent decades3 to its incentive contracts for managers, for example,
3However, Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) find that the average funds of hedge funds only
deliver alphas during 1998-2000.
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Liang (1999), Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Agarwal, Daniel and
Naik (2009). The literature also documents that other contractual factors attribute to the
alpha production of hedge funds. For example, Aragon and Qian (2007) study HWM in
an informational setting where the manager quality is unknown to investors. They find
that funds imposing liquidity constraints are more likely to have HWMs to reduce risk
of investor-driven liquidation and also, hedge funds with HTM have higher survival rate.
Aragon (2007) find significant share illiquidity premium associated with redemption re-
strictions.
3.2.2 Hedge Fund Risk Dynamics
The hedge fund literature is also growing on evidence that hedge funds have time-
varying risk exposures and on innovative methodologies that capture the risk dynamics. For
example, Fung and Hsieh (1997) provide empirical evidence that hedge funds follow dy-
namic trading strategies which cannot be detected by conventional risk factors that explain
mutual fund returns well. Fung and Hsieh (2004) further propose a seven-factor model
suitable for explaining dynamic risk factor loadings of hedge funds. Agarwal and Naik
(2004) find nonlinearity in risk factor exposures and significant tail risk. Fung, Hsieh, Naik
and Ramadorai (2008) study hedge fund risk exposures in three sub-periods and document
a significant structural change in risk dynamics. Patton and Ramadorai (2010) propose us-
ing high frequency conditional information to identify hedge fund risk dynamics and they
find that the main drivers for risk change are cost of leverage, carry trade returns and the
recent equity market index performance. Bollen and Whaley (2009) compare two empiri-
cal methodologies of capturing hedge fund risk shifting and emphasize the importance of
accounting for hedge fund risk dynamics.
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3.2.3 Risk Taking and Risk Shifting Behaviors of Hedge Fund and
Mutual Fund Managers
Our research is also related to literature of asset managers’ incentives and performance
consequences of risk taking and risk shifting. Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) find that the
risk taking behaviors of mutual fund managers vary depending on whether the ’employment
risk incentives’ or the ’compensation incentives’ predominate in a particular year. Massa
and Patgiri (2009) find evidence that high-incentive mutual fund contracts lead to higher
risk taking, higher risk-adjusted performance and persistence in out-performance though
they also reduce a fund’s survival probability. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) address
that one reason for mutual fund managers to shift risk is the incentives to play ’tournament
games’. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) lend empirical evidence to the rationale of risk tour-
nament by finding that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship can explain the
increase or decrease in the riskiness of a mutual fund. Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001)
extend the study to hedge fund industry and find that risk shifts in hedge funds and CTAs
are associated with relative performance rather than absolute performance. They attribute
the finding to career concerns and reputation costs. Clare and Motson (2009) address the
tournament behaviors among hedge fund managers and argue that option-like incentives
drive managers’ risk taking. However, their study shows that the tournament behaviors are
dominated by lock-in behaviors, i.e. a successful fund reducing risk. Aragon and Nanda
(2009) investigate the same issue and conclude that tournament is prevailing mainly in the
incubation period. Chen and Liang (2007)find that self-described market timing hedge
funds possess market timing skills at both individual and aggregate levels, especially when
the U.S equity market is bearish and volatile. Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2009) report that
hedge funds capable of timing market liquidity conditions significant outperform peers.
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3.2.4 HWM
The use of HWM, a unique loss recovery provision widely adopted by venture cap-
ital funds, private equity funds, hedge funds and commodity trading advisors(CTAs), is
also discussed in hedge fund literature. Carpenter (2000) theoretically studies option-like
incentive contracts and HWM, and finds that the option-like compensation for a fund man-
ager does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking behavior. Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross
(2003) propose a theoretical model to evaluate the cost of the HWM provision to managers
and compute the alpha-generation skill necessary to justify a fund manager’s compensa-
tion. Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) justify the use of HWM by using a multi-year evalua-
tion to show that a manager’s risk taking is more diverse than can be generated by existing
one-period models. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) address that spanning a manager’s
investment horizon can effectively reduce her risk taking despite her risk appetite.
3.3 Data
The hedge fund data used in our empirical study come from the Lipper TASS hedge
fund database, one of the leading hedge fund data vendors. Since the hedge fund industry
has been historically subject to very light regulation, there are no mandatory reporting
standards that hedge fund managers are required to follow. As a result, there exists a
collection of well-documented hedge fund database biases that hedge fund researchers need
to carefully cope with. For example, hedge fund data may contain only information for
funds that are still in operation and lack the information for funds that are already out
of business or closed to new investments (referred to as ’survivorship bias’). Hedge fund
managers may choose whether to report to data vendors and if so, which vendor(s) to report
to at utter discretion (referred to as ’self-selection bias’). After they report to a database,
managers can voluntarily provide the data vendor with their track records, where there is no
guarantee that the reported historical performance has been audited and validated (referred
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to as ’back-filling bias’). For more detailed analyses of the impact of these biases, see
Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999),Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Liang (2000).
In view of this, we impose several screening criteria in selecting our sample in order to
minimize the influence of potential biases.
(1) We include both the ’live funds’ and ’graveyard funds’ reported by TASS in our
sample. Our sample only covers Jan. 1994 through Dec. 2008 because ’graveyard funds’
were not recorded by Lipper TASS until 1994. Every fund in our sample must be denomi-
nated in US dollars, report monthly returns, management fees and incentive fees, and have
complete return history for at least one calendar year. These criteria result in a total sample
of 8244 hedge funds, of which 3402 are ‘live’ and 4842 are ’defunct’.
(2) We retrieve the date on which a specific fund is added to TASS database and deem
the period between the date of the first reported return and the adding date as the incubation
period. If the adding date is missing for a fund, we use the first 18 months to proxy for
the incubation period. There are in total 37108 fund years, of which 19161 are during
incubation period and 17947 are during non-incubation period.
(3) Hedge fund returns in TASS database are categorized into three groups, gross re-
turns, net returns, and gross returns net of management fees. We use the methodology
proposed by Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007) with some minor modification (detailed be-
low in Section 3.2) to generate the gross return series for all hedge funds if only after-fee
returns are reported. Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007) point out that the use of net returns
tends to underestimate the mean and variation of the ”true returns” or the gross returns from
a manager’s operation.
3.3.1 Measuring Absolute Performance
Since the fee structure of hedge fund managers contains performance fees that allow
managers to collect a portion of returns as long as they beat the historical high or previous
year’s NAV, managers should have additional economic incentives that deviate from that
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arising from performance relative to other funds. We measure the incentives from ‘absolute
performance’ by two means, first, whether a hedge fund is currently under the HWM, and
second, the ‘moneyness’ of a hedge fund if we consider the performance fee as a call option
with the HWM being the strike.
Both measures involve an estimation of the HWM, which is a difficult task because
the HWM of a hedge fund may not be unique since a hedge fund can have multiple share
classes or multiple investors who enter the fund at different times. Based on a simplifying
assumption that a hedge fund at any time can have only one HWM, we measure its absolute
performance as follows,
Moneynessi,t =
NAVi,t
NAV ∗i,t
−1 (3.1)
NAV ∗i,t is the mininum NAV of a hedge fund that allows the manager to charge perfor-
mance fees. Specifically, it is the historical high of NAV (HWM) for hedge funds with a
HWM and the NAV at previous year-end for hedge funds without a HWM. NAV ∗i,t plays
a very important role in providing managers with incentives since it is the threshold over
which the pay-performance slope (or sensitivity) becomes positive from zero. According
to the above definition, a negative moneyness means that the manager needs to make pos-
itive returns during the current period before she can charge performance fees. A positive
moneyness, on the other hand, means that the manager is able to charge performance fees
with current NAV.
3.3.2 Computing HWM and Gross Returns
Similar to Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007), We solve for the HWM and gross return
series for each hedge fund that features a HWM recursively following the procedure in
Appendix B.4
4In accordance with most common hedge fund industry practice, we assume that management fees are
paid monthly, and performance fees are accrued monthly and paid yearly.
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In Table 3.1, we present basic descriptive statistics of the performance and risk of
hedge funds over 1994-2008 in our sample. Lipper TASS database categorizes an indi-
vidual hedge fund into 13 risk styles, namely, Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short Bias,
Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Fund
of Funds, Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge, Managed Futures, Multi-Strategy,
Options Strategy and Other Strategies. For each subgroup in Table 3.1, we construct an
equally-weighted hedge fund portfolio and report its performance.
In Table 3.2, we report important hedge fund fee contract provisions, such as man-
agement fee, incentive fee, whether a hedge fund has HWM, whether a hedge fund permits
management to invest own capital, whether a hedge fund sets a lock-up period, etc. In Panel
B, we also estimate the length of time a hedge fund is under the water, accrued incentive
fees and moneyness defined in Equation(3.1), in order to depict a rough picture of the sig-
nificance and magnitude of economic incentives resulting from absolute performance.5 It
is noteworthy that on average a hedge fund stays for quite a long time, 6.5 months under
water in a calendar year. The average monthly accrued incentive fees amount to 0.41% of
the asset under management, which outweighs the average monthly management fee that
equals about 1.5%÷12≈ 0.125%. Besides, the average moneyness is slightly higher than
zero, implying that the call option of the manager’s incentive fees is approximately ‘at the
money’, where the vega reaches its maximum and the value of the call is most sensitive to
the underlying’s volatility.
3.4 Intra-year Systematic Risk Shifting
In this section, we employ optimal changing-point regressions to identify systematic
risk shifting of hedge fund managers during a calendar year.
5we assume an annual hurdle rate of 4% in computation, since Lipper TASS does not provide uniform
reports of this variable.
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3.4.1 Factor Analyses and BIC
In order to identify the risk factors to which a particular hedge fund is exposed within
a calendar year, we first apply three-factor OLS regression models to the monthly returns
for each hedge fund. Risk factor candidates include the three Fama-French factors, namely,
MKTXS, the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted index, SMB, the size factor and
HML, the value factor, as well as the seven Fung and Hsieh asset-based style factors that
are, D10YR, the change in the 10-year treasury yield, DSPRD, the change in the spread
between BAA yield and 10-year treasury yield6, PTFSBD, primitive trend follower strat-
egy bond, PTFSFX, primitive trend follower strategy currency, PTFSCOM, primitive trend
follower strategy commodity, PTFSIR, primitive trend follower strategy interest rate, and
PTFSSTK, primitive trend follower strategy stock .7
There are 28974 fund-years in the sample and 120 possible combinations of three fac-
tors out of the 10 candidates. For each fund-year, we run a three-factor OLS regression
model and repeat this procedure for 120 times with all different combinations of three risk
factors . We then select the set of three factors that results in the lowest Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) and therefore the highest adjusted R2 for each fund-year.
Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics of the three-factor models within each risk
strategy. On average, the optimal three-factor model is able to explain 63% of the variability
in the time-series of individual hedge fund monthly returns in a calendar year. Table 3.3
also provides an overview of the explanatory power that each risk factor has on different
hedge fund strategies . For example, MKTXS, the U.S equity market index, is an important
factor for 12 out of 13 strategies with no surprise. PTFSIR, the short-term interest rate
factor, also has important explanatory power for 8 out of 13 strategies. One reason is that
the performance of those hedge fund strategies that employ heavy financial leverage is
sensitive to the change in short-term borrowing costs that is reflected in PTFSIR.
6D10YR and DSPRD are downloaded from the U.S Federal Reserves website.
7The five trend follower factors are available at David Hsiehs website.
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3.4.2 Optimal Change-point Regressions
In last section, we have identified the three most important risk factors in explaining the
time-series of monthly returns in a year for each hedge fund. Now we proceed to investi-
gate whether a particular hedge fund changes its risk exposure during a year by performing
optimal changing-point regressions, with the assumption that a hedge fund manager in a
year sticks to the original risk strategy characterized by the risk factors she chooses in the
beginning of a year and only changes factor loadings subsequently. Therefore, she does
not shift from one risk strategy (a set of risk factors) to another . The optimal change-point
regression model is employed for this purpose since it can be used to test for parameter
consistency against the alternative of possible structural changes at unknown times. There-
fore, if a hedge fund manager significantly changes her factor loadings during a year, the
optimal change-point regression should be able to unveil the timing and magnitude of the
shift in risk taking. Following Bollen and Whaley (2009), we allow the presence of one
single change-point for individual hedge funds during a year . The three-factor model we
use to capture the intra-year risk dynamics of hedge fund is as follows,
ri,t =

αi+∑3j=1βi, j fi, j+ εi, j when t ≤ τi,
αi+α0i +∑
3
j=1(βi, j+β 0i, j) fi, j+ εi, j when t > τi.
(3.2)
where ri,t is the return on hedge fund i in month t; fi, j is the return on hedge fund i’s
risk factor in month t and τi is the change-point for hedge fund i.
Whether a hedge fund manager i changes risk exposure during a year can thus be tested
via
H i0 : α
0
i = 0 and β
0
i, j = 0, for j = 1,2,3 (3.3)
The optimal change-point regression model searches across all possible change-points
during a year. Since we adopt a three-factor model, possible dates for a hedge fund manager
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to change risk exposures are then the end of May, June and July.
Andrews, Lee and Ploberger (1996) derive the F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis
for change-point , when the error variances are unknown as below,
F(pi) =
[Q∗−Q(pi)](T −2v)
Q(pi)v
(3.4)
Where Q∗ is the sum of squared errors for the whole time period (the unrestricted
model) and Q(pi) is the sum of squared errors when the risk exposures before and post date
are allowed to differ. T is the total months of a year and v−1 is the number of risk factors.
In our three-factor model, v= 4.
The F-statistics of all possible pi are then calculated and an Avg-F statistic, assuming
that changes in risk exposures are small, can be then computed as follows,
Avg-F = ∑
pi⊂Π
F(pi)J(pi) (3.5)
Where J(pi) is a weighting function and since we have no specific reason that any
change-points are more likely than others, each change-point receives equal weights in
computing Avg-F statistic.
3.4.3 Bootstrapped Critical Values
As pointed out in Andrews, Lee and Ploberger (1996), the critical value for the Avg-F
introduced above is model specific and data specific. Empirical critical values need to be
computed for the purpose of testing the statistic significance of risk exposure changes. We
obey the following procedure in generating bootstrapped hedge fund returns.
1. For each hedge fund that has a full calendar year of reported monthly returns, we per-
form an OLS regression on the three factors that has the lowest BIC (the highest Adjusted
R2), and save the constant risk factor loadings and residual terms.
2. For each bootstrapped hedge fund return series of a year, we draw factor returns
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during that year with replacement, multiply the factor returns by the OLS estimates of
factor loadings, and add original residual terms as follows,
ri,t = αˆi+
3
∑
j=1
βˆi, j f
(b)
i, j + εˆi, j (3.6)
3. For each fund year, we simulate 1000 such return series and for each return series,
we compute the Avg-F statistic in (4).
4. Since all factor returns are drawn randomly with replacement and the original resid-
ual terms are reserved, such bootstrapping should provide an empirical distribution of the
Avg-F under the null hypothesis of no change in risk exposures.
5. The 100th largest test statistic therefore gives the empirical critical value at 10% sig-
nificance level. We then compare the Avg-F from the original model with its bootstrapped
critical value for each fund year. If the original Avg-F is higher then the bootstrapped one,
then we reject the null hypothesis that this hedge fund does not change risk exposure in a
year.
Out of 28970 complete fund years (6176 funds during Jan. 1994 and Dec. 2008), we
find 1963 fund years (1572 funds during Jan. 1994 and Dec. 2008) that change their risk
exposures at 10% significant level.
3.5 Managerial Incentives and Adverse Selection
Hedge fund managers change risk exposures for varies reasons. For example, skillful
or informed managers may alter their risk factor loadings in response to changing market
conditions and produce alpha, as found in Chen and Liang (2007) and Cao, Chen, Liang
and Lo (2009). On the other hand, asset managers may also shift risk exposures due to
ill-aligned interests between investors and the manager, as addressed in Brown, Harlow
and Starks (1996) and Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001). Huang, Sialm and Zhang
(2010) find that the most actively risk-shifting mutual funds have the poorest post-shifting
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performance and they attribute this results to ill-motivated trading activities and agency
problems.
3.5.1 Informed, Uninformed and Misinformed Hedge Fund Managers
From a risk-averse investor’s viewpoint, a fund manager’s risk-shifting decisions, if
any, should reflect the best interest of investors and result in improved risk-adjusted returns.
Among the set of risk shifting funds we have identified in last section, we categorize their
fund managers into three groups, informed, uninformed and misinformed, according to the
change in the Shape Ratio before and after the shift of risk exposures.
Table 3.4 lists the results. It can be observed from Panel A that ’informed’ hedge fund
managers on aggregate reduce their total risk and the change in accumulated return after
shifting (14.19%) is highest among the three groups. As a result, ’informed’ hedge fund
managers improve the Sharpe Ratio by 6.86 on average and create value for investors via
their risk shifting decisions.
’Uninformed’ hedge fund managers on aggregate do not improve their risk-adjusted
returns via their risk shifting decisions, as indicated by the barely changed Sharpe Ratio.
On average, this group of managers moderately increases their total risk by about 0.36%
monthly but does not result in significant boost in returns.
’Misinformed’ hedge fund managers, on the other hand, aggressively increase their
portfolio risk by 1.30% monthly, however, perform poorly after the risk shifting and there-
fore result in deteriorated Sharpe Ratio. The group-wise differences on the change in the
Sharpe Ratio, the change in accumulated returns, and the change in standard deviation be-
fore and after risk shifting are all significant at 1% level, showing that the performance and
risk-shifting characteristics between groups are both statistically and economically distinct.
Further, we in Panel B examine the differences of fund characteristics between groups,
such as fund age, assets under management (AUM), the percentage of incentive fees and
management fees, whether a fund features a HWM, whether a fund allows managers to in-
96
vest own capital, and whether a fund utilizes financial leverage. Panel B demonstrates that
unlike the performance and risk shifting characteristics, there is merely any statistically
significant difference between groups on fund characteristics, except that ’misinformed’
hedge fund managers on average are 0.7 years shorter in tenure than ’informed’ and ’un-
informed’ hedge fund managers. The results in Panel B show that it is not likely that the
categorization of ’informed’, ’uninformed’ and ’misinformed’ hedge fund managers is due
to its high correlation to some fund characteristics.
3.5.2 Different Risk Appetites and Adverse Selection
In this section, we use multivariate regression models to investigate how each group
of hedge fund managers makes risk shifting decisions differently in response to their own
incentive contracts, changing market conditions and their style peers risk shifting decisions.
First, we run the following specification,
∆σi, j,t = α+β1 ·Money+i,t+β2 ·Money−i,t+β3 ·Money+i,t · IHWMi +β4 ·Money−i,t · IHWMi
+ γ1 ·Vixt−1+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ Index jt−1 · I j+ γ4 ·∆σ
Index j
t · I j+ γ5 ·σi,t−1+ γ6 ·Ri,t−1(3.7)
+ γ7 · IHWMi +∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
The dependent variable is the change in standard deviation of a hedge fund before
and after it changes risk exposures. The moneyness of a hedge fund manager’s incentive
contract at time t is defined in Equation( 3.1) Moneyness serves a proxy for managerial
incentives from the contract, and β1 captures the relation between a fund managers risk
shifting behavior and her fee incentives when moneyness is positive, that is, the fund is
operating above the water mark ). β2 captures the relation when moneyness is negative. β3
and β4 capture the interactive effect between moneyness and whether a hedge fund uses a
HWM. Vix and ∆Vix proxy for the U.S equity market volatility and its change. σ Index jt−1 · I j
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and ∆σ Index jt · I j control for the risk and change in risk of the same strategy hedge fund
index and σi,t−1 controls for individual fund risk taking before shifting. Ri,t−1 is fund is
accumulated return prior to risk shifting.
OLS estimates for all three hedge fund manager groups are reported in Table 3.5. Each
group demonstrates very distinctive risk-shifting behavior related to incentive contracts.
The risk shifting of ’informed’ managers does not seem to be related to either moneyness or
the HWM provision. To the opposite, ’misinformed’ managers aggressively shift risk when
they have found themselves below the water. ’Uninformed’ managers risk shifting behavior
is moderate in response to their moneyness compared to the other two groups and they
only respond to the upside of moneyness. It is also worth noticing that the ’uninformed’
managers, unlike the other two groups, positively and significantly respond to the risk
shifting decisions of peer managers in the same strategy because the coefficients of index
risk level and the change in index risk level are both positive and statistically significance.
The results in Table 3.5 reflect agency problems that induce adverse selection. Namely,
the prevailing hedge fund incentive contracts encourage the least informed managers to
shift risk in the most aggressive manner, while this group of managers is least sophisticated
in risk management and alpha-producing.
3.5.3 Beta Risk Shifting vs. Idiosyncratic Risk Shifting
In this section, we further examine how these three groups of hedge fund managers
make beta risk shifting and idiosyncratic risk shifting decisions in response to their incen-
tive contracts. We rerun the regression model in Equation(3.7), replacing the dependent
variables with beta risk measure and unsystematic risk measure, respectively.
The beta risk regression model is as follows,
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∆σbetai, j,t = α+β1 ·Money+i,t+β2 ·Money−i,t+β3 ·Money+i,t · IHWMi +β4 ·Money−i,t · IHWMi
+ γ1 ·Vixt−1+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ Index jt−1 · I j+ γ4 ·∆σ
Index j
t · I j+ γ5 ·σi,t−1+ γ6 ·Ri,t−1(3.8)
+ γ7 · IHWMi +∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
where
∆σbetai, j,t =
√
SSMi, j,t
k
−
√
SSMi, j,t−1
k
in which SSM is the sum of squares about the mean from the three-factor model for
hedge fund i that has the lowest BIC. k is the number of explanatory variables (three in our
models).
Table 3.6 reports the estimates. ’Informed’ hedge fund managers do not exhibit signifi-
cant risk shifting behaviors in response to the variables related to their incentive contracts.
’Uninformed’ hedge fund managers respond to Moneyness when it is positive. ’Misin-
formed’ hedge fund managers aggressively increase beta risk when they are below the
water. HWM provision does not function in restraining managers from excessive beta risk
shifting, since no interactive term is positive and significant.
The idiosyncratic risk regression model is as follows,
∆σalphai, j,t = α+β1 ·Money+i,t+β2 ·Money−i,t+β3 ·Money+i,t · IHWMi +β4 ·Money−i,t · IHWMi
+ γ1 ·Vixt−1+ γ2 ·∆Vixt+ γ3 ·σ Index jt−1 · I j+ γ4 ·∆σ
Index j
t · I j+ γ5 ·σi,t−1+ γ6 ·Ri,t−1(3.9)
+ γ7 · IHWMi +∑
k
δk ·YearDummyk+∑
l
λl ·StyleDummyl+ εi,t
where
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∆σalphai, j,t =
√
SSEi, j,t
n− k−1 −
√
SSEi, j,t−1
n− k−1
in which SSE is the sum of squared errors from the three-factor model for hedge fund i
that has the lowest BIC. k is the number of explanatory variables (three in our models) and
n is the total number of observations in each time-series regression model.
Table 3.7 reports the estimates. All three groups of managers show significant sen-
sitivity of risk shifting to incentive contracts. Moreover, the incentive to increase risk is
stronger when a manager is underperforming than when she is outperforming her own
HWM. Among the three groups, ’misinformed’ managers again, exhibit the most aggres-
sive manner of risk shifting in response to both downside and upside of Moneyness. HWM
works well in reducing ”informed’ and ’misinformed’ managers’ risk taking since the in-
teractive term of for these two groups is negative and significant, indicating that all else
equal, managers that have HWM in these two groups tend to take less risk than managers
that do not in response to underperformance.
To summarize the findings of this section, ’informed’, ’uninformed’ and ’misinformed’
managers exhibit very distinct risk shifting behaviors in response to their personal compen-
sation related to incentive contracts. ’Misinformed’ managers are the most aggressive in
increasing both beta and alpha risk. On the other hand, ’informed’ managers do not signifi-
cant associate their risk shifting decisions to incentive contracts and ’uninformed’ managers
respond moderately. The total risk shifting behavior is similar to the beta risk shifting be-
havior for all three groups. Regarding alpha risk shifting, all three groups exhibit strong
sensitivity of risk shifting to incentive contracts. Again, ’uninformed’ managers have the
highest sensitivity. HWM, designed to align interests between managers and investors, only
imposes limited influence on reducing excessive risk taking.
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3.5.4 Remedy for Adverse Selection and Funds of Hedge Funds
The presence of adverse selection stems from the asymmetry of information between
managers and investors. The problem is further worsened by the lack of transparency
problem increasingly scrutinized in recent years on the whole hedge fund industry. Funds
of Hedge Funds, as suggested in the literature (e.g. see Fung and Hsieh (2000), Brown,
Goetzmann and Liang (2003) and Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008)) serve many
functions, such as manager selection, portfolio construction, risk management, monitoring
and due diligence for investors who prefer the delegated approach of accessing hedge funds.
In Table 3.8, we examine whether the adverse selection problem can be mitigated when
the regression model is performed only on fund of hedge funds. It shows that compared
to previous results, the three groups exhibit much less risk taking in response to incentive
contracts.
3.6 Robustness Tests
3.6.1 Risk Shifting vs. Non-shifting Funds
The above results should not be applied to an extended group of hedge funds if the
set of risk shifting funds lacks representativeness for the whole hedge fund family. In this
section, we compare shifting funds to non-shifting funds and investigate whether the two
groups differ from each other on age, size, risk strategy, and other fund characteristics.
Figure 1 compares the distribution of risk style for risk shifting funds to that for the
whole hedge fund family. It shows that risk shifting is not concentrated on a risk strategies,
but rather widespread among the hedge fund family.
Figure 2 reports the distribution of calendar years in the period of 1994-2008. It shows
that the distribution of shifting funds does not differ much from that of non-shifting funds
except for 2005. Table 3.9 tabulates the difference between shifting and non-shifting funds.
101
It shows that these two groups do no significant differ from each other on either perfor-
mance or fund characteristics.
3.6.2 Alternative Risk-adjusted Performance Measures and Catego-
rization
In order to ensure the robustness of our results in Table 3.5-3.7, we use different risk-
adjusted performance measures other than the Sharpe Ratio in identifying informed, unin-
formed and misinformed hedge fund managers as follows,
(1) A pseudo-Treynor Ratio, ri−r f√
SSM/k
, and
(2) The Information Ratio ri−rb√
Var(r−rb)
, where rb, the benchmark return, is the hedge
fund index return with the same strategy.
We also rank and divide risk-shifting hedge fund managers into 3, 5 and 6 groups
according to their change in risk-adjusted performance and label the top and bottom groups
as ’Informed’ and ’Misinformed’ managers. The group(s) in between is then labelled as
’Uninformed’ managers.
Our main results in Table 3.5-3.7 are robust to all combinations of alternative risk-
adjusted performance measures and different group numbers. Table 3.10-3.12 report the
regression estimates when the pseudo-Treynor Ratio is used and when the group number is
five.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the risk shifting decisions of hedge fund managers in response
to their personal compensation from the incentive contracts. Although documented to be
positively associated with superior long term performance, hedge fund incentive contracts
do not seem to align interests well between investors and managers, regarding their influ-
ence on managers risk taking and shifting behaviors. Namely, given prevailing incentive
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contracts, the least skillful and informed managers tend to make the most aggressively risk
shifting decisions in response to the possibility to charge incentive fees and result in inferior
performance consequences.
The finding of the ’Adverse Selection’ problem reflects the failure of hedge fund man-
agers to signal their types to potential investors, and the malfunction of incentive contracts
in revealing hedge fund managers quality. The results of our research call for better mech-
anism design for investors to identity managers characteristics, to reduce informational
asymmetry and to penalize managers for actions that deviate from the best interest of hedge
fund investors.
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Table 3.5 Total Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund Managers 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 ,
j j
j HWM
i t i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
HWM
i t i t k k l l i t
k l
Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy StyleDummy
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ λ ε
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + +∑ ∑
 
 
The dependent variable is the change in standard deviation of a hedge fund before and after it 
changes risk exposures. Control variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  
∆Vixt, the semi-annual change in it, j j
Index IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of 
Credit Suisse Tremont Hedge Fund Indices of 10 risk strategies1, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-
annual change in it, and ,1iσ , the first six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
  
                                                     
1 With the only exception of Fund of Hedge Funds, for which the TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average 
is used. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept 2.13 0.27 2.55 
Moneyness+ -0.13 0.46*** -0.05 
HWM*Moneyness+ 0.09 -0.03 0.35*** 
Moneyness- -0.16 -0.19 -1.10*** 
HWM*Moneyness- -0.16 -0.14 0.43* 
VIXt-1 -0.05 0.00 -0.18 
∆VIX 0.96 0.33 0.81 
σ-1Index -0.02 0.36*** -0.26 
∆ σIndex 0.11 0.21*** 0.02 
σ-1 -0.79*** -0.57*** -0.70*** r-1 -0.04*** -0.02 0.10*** HWM -0.32 -0.21 -0.26 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Observations 480 960 480 Adj. R2 53.2% 35.6% 37.8% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 3.6 Beta Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund Managers 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
( )
, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
( )
5 , , 1 6 , 1 7
j j
beta HWM
i t j i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
beta HWM
i t i t k k l
k
Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy StyleD
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ λ
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑ ,l i t
l
ummy ε+∑
 
 
The dependent variable is , , , 1,( ), ,
i t j i t jbeta
i t j
SSM SSM
k k
σ −∆ = − , in which SSM is the sum of 
squares about the mean from the three-factor model for hedge fund i that has the lowest BIC.. 
Control variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  ∆Vixt, the semi-annual 
change in it, j jIndex IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of Credit Suisse Tremont 
Hedge Fund Indices of 10 risk strategies2, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-annual change in it, and ,1iσ
, the first six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
 
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
  
                                                     
2 With the only exception of Fund of Hedge Funds, for which the TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average 
is used. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept 6.20 -1.12 8.05 
Moneyness+ -0.32 1.09*** -0.24 
HWM*Moneyness+ 0.09 -0.10 0.86*** 
Moneyness- -0.57 -0.38 -2.79*** 
HWM*Moneyness- -0.33 -0.45 1.28 
VIXt-1 -0.23 0.14 -0.61 
∆VIX 2.41 0.26 2.60 
σ-1Index 0.20 0.98*** -0.58 
∆ σIndex 0.39 0.49*** 0.06 
σ-1 -0.78*** -0.55*** -0.66*** r-1 -0.08 -0.04 0.22 HWM -0.95 -0.47 -0.73 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Observations 384 1152 378 Adj. R2 51.7% 36.4% 38.0% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 3.7 Idiosyncratic Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund 
Managers 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
( )
, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
( )
5 , , 1 6 , 1 7
j j
alpha HWM
i t j i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
alpha HWM
i t i t k k l
k
Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy Styl
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ λ
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑ ,l i t
l
eDummy ε+∑
 
 
The dependent variable is where , , , 1,( ), , 1 1
i t j i t jalpha
i t j
SSE SSE
n k n k
σ −∆ = −
− − − −
, in which SSE is the sum 
of squared errors from the three-factor model for hedge fund i that has the lowest BIC. Control 
variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  ∆Vixt, the semi-annual change in it, 
j jIndex IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of Credit Suisse Tremont Hedge Fund 
Indices of 10 risk strategies3, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-annual change in it, and ,1iσ , the first 
six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
  
                                                     
3 With the only exception of Fund of Hedge Funds, for which the TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average 
is used. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept -1.06 -1.39 0.54 
Moneyness+ 0.09** 0.12*** 0.14*** 
HWM*Moneyness+ 0.07 -0.01 -0.05* 
Moneyness- -0.25*** -0.16*** -0.50*** 
HWM*Moneyness- 0.12** 0.05 0.32** 
VIXt-1 0.10 0.11 -0.02 
∆VIX -0.21 -0.03 0.00 
σ-1Index 0.11 0.18*** -0.01 
∆ σIndex 0.03 0.03** 0.01 
σ-1 -0.72*** -0.71*** -0.82*** r-1 0.01 0.00 0.01 HWM -0.06 -0.04 -0.10* Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Observations 480 960 480 Adj. R2 52.0% 45.6% 49.8% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 3.8 Total Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund Managers 
on Funds of Hedge Funds 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 ,
j j
j HWM
i t i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
HWM
i t i t k k i t
k
Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ ε
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑
 
 
The dependent variable is the change in standard deviation of a hedge fund before and after it 
changes risk exposures. Control variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  
∆Vixt, the semi-annual change in it, j j
Index IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of 
TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-annual change in it, and ,1iσ , 
the first six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept -3.79 4.32 0.72 
Moneyness+ 2.30 0.19 1.07** 
HWM*Moneyness+ -0.73 0.32 -0.54* 
Moneyness- -0.18 -0.11 -0.60 
HWM*Moneyness- -0.14 -0.70 -0.23 
VIXt-1 0.12 -1.32** 0.20 
∆VIX -0.10 0.54*** 0.03 
σ-1Index 2.25 10.02** -2.37 
∆ σIndex 0.89 2.67 -0.24 
σ-1 -0.94*** -0.21*** -0.66*** r-1 -0.16*** 0.03 0.04 HWM -0.35 -0.24 -0.35 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies No No No Observations 115 232 116 Adj. R2 79.9% 44.8% 64.8% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 3.9 Comparison between Shifting and Non-Shifting Hedge Funds 
 
Panel A reports the differences of shifting and non-shifting hedge funds on returns, monthly 
standard deviation, assets under management (AUM) and moneyness. Panel B compares the fund 
characteristics of the two groups. T-test significance for the comparisons is also provided. 
 
Panel A Comparison of Mean Performance Variables 
 Shifting Non-Shifting (1)-(2) 
Number of Funds 1572 4604  
Returns (%) 0.55 0.61 0.06 
STD (%) 3.41 3.27 0.14 
AUM (million dollars) 150.1 148.2 1.95 
Moneyness -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 
Panel B Comparison of Mean Fund Characteristics 
 Shifting Non-Shifting (1)-(2) 
Age (years) 6.65 6.45 0.19 
IFee (%) 16.14 15.44 0.69 
MFee (%) 1.45 1.47 -0.02 
HighWaterMark (dummy) 0.59 0.59 -0.01 
Personal Capital (dummy) 0.27 0.28 -0.02 
Leverage (dummy) 0.49 0.55 -0.07 
*, **, *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.10 Robustness Check 
Total Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund Managers 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 ,
j j
j HWM
i t i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
HWM
i t i t k k l l i t
k l
Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy StyleDummy
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ λ ε
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + +∑ ∑
 
 
The dependent variable is the change in standard deviation of a hedge fund before and after it 
changes risk exposures. Control variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  
∆Vixt, the semi-annual change in it, j j
Index IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of 
Credit Suisse Tremont Hedge Fund Indices of 10 risk strategies4, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-
annual change in it, and ,1iσ , the first six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
All risk-shifting hedge fund managers are ranked according to their change in 
/
i fr r
SSM k
−
before 
and after the risk-shifting and then divided into 5 groups. The top and bottom groups are 
identified as “Informed” and “Misinformed” managers. The rest three groups are “Uninformed” 
managers.  
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
  
                                                     
4 With the only exception of Fund of Hedge Funds, for which the TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average 
is used. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept 3.33 0.32 2.53 
Moneyness+ -0.25 0.31*** 0.04 
HWM*Moneyness+ 0.19 0.10 0.24** 
Moneyness- -0.21 -0.22 -1.44*** 
HWM*Moneyness- 0.16 0.07 0.75* 
VIXt-1 1.36 0.03 -0.12 
∆VIX -0.73 -0.08 0.81 
σ-1Index -0.01 0.23** -0.05 
∆ σIndex 0.21* 0.19*** 0.02 
σ-1 -0.76*** -0.57*** -0.84*** r-1 -0.03 -0.03* -0.12*** HWM -0.33 -0.25 -0.31 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Observations 384 1152 378 Adj. R2 53.9% 37.2% 40.9% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 3.11 Robustness Check 
Beta Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund Managers 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
( )
, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
( )
5 , , 1 6 , 1 7
j j
beta HWM
i t j i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
beta HWM
i t i t k k l
k
Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy StyleD
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ λ
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑ ,l i t
l
ummy ε+∑
 
 
The dependent variable is , , , 1,( ), ,
i t j i t jbeta
i t j
SSM SSM
k k
σ −∆ = − , in which SSM is the sum of 
squares about the mean from the three-factor model for hedge fund i that has the lowest BIC.. 
Control variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  ∆Vixt, the semi-annual 
change in it, j jIndex IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of Credit Suisse Tremont 
Hedge Fund Indices of 10 risk strategies5, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-annual change in it, and ,1iσ
, the first six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
All risk-shifting hedge fund managers are ranked according to their change in 
/
i fr r
SSM k
−
before 
and after the risk-shifting and then divided into 5 groups. The top and bottom groups are 
identified as “Informed” and “Misinformed” managers. The rest three groups are “Uninformed” 
managers.  
 
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
  
                                                     
5 With the only exception of Fund of Hedge Funds, for which the TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average 
is used. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept 4.06 -0.25 6.93 
Moneyness+ -0.48 0.63 -0.06 
HWM*Moneyness+ 0.29 0.21 0.61 
Moneyness- -0.62 -0.97 -3.35*** 
HWM*Moneyness- 0.40 0.18 1.81*** 
VIXt-1 0.23 0.14 -0.38 
∆VIX -1.78 -0.51 2.69 
σ-1Index 0.25 0.66* -1.17 
∆ σIndex 0.62 0.45*** 0.04 
σ-1 -0.77*** -0.54*** -0.77*** r-1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.26*** HWM -0.87 -0.65 -0.66 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Observations 480 960 480 Adj. R2 50.2% 35.3% 36.8% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Table 3.12 Robustness Check 
Idiosyncratic Risk Shifting Behavior of Three Groups of Hedge Fund Managers 
 
This table reports the outputs of the following OLS regression model: 
 
 
( )
, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 2 3 4
( )
5 , , 1 6 , 1 7
j j
alpha HWM
i t j i t i t i t
Index IndexHWM j j
i t t t t t
alpha HWM
i t i t k k l
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Moneyness Moneyness I Moneyness
Moneyness I Vix Vix I I
r I YearDummy Styl
σ α β β β
β γ γ γ σ γ σ
γ σ γ γ δ λ
+ + −
−
− −
∆ = + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∆ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∆ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑ ,l i t
l
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The dependent variable is where , , , 1,( ), , 1 1
i t j i t jalpha
i t j
SSE SSE
n k n k
σ −∆ = −
− − − −
, in which SSE is the sum 
of squared errors from the three-factor model for hedge fund i that has the lowest BIC. Control 
variables include Vixt, the contemporary VIX Index average,  ∆Vixt, the semi-annual change in it, 
j jIndex IndexIσ ⋅ , the first six-month standard deviation of Credit Suisse Tremont Hedge Fund 
Indices of 10 risk strategies6, j jIndex IndexIσ∆ ⋅ , the semi-annual change in it, and ,1iσ , the first 
six-month standard deviation of individual hedge funds. 
 
All risk-shifting hedge fund managers are ranked according to their change in 
/
i fr r
SSM k
−
before 
and after the risk-shifting and then divided into 5 groups. The top and bottom groups are 
identified as “Informed” and “Misinformed” managers. The rest three groups are “Uninformed” 
managers.  
 
 
These tests correct for heteroscedasticity in residual errors and diagnostic analyses do not detect 
mutlilinearity and serial correlation. *,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.  All regressions control for the fixed effects of years and hedge fund strategies. 
The hurdle rate is set to 4% throughout this table. 
  
                                                     
6 With the only exception of Fund of Hedge Funds, for which the TASS Fund of Funds Universe Average 
is used. 
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 Informed Uninformed Misinformed 
Intercept -0.43 -1.04 0.39 
Moneyness+ 0.05 0.13*** 0.11*** 
HWM*Moneyness+ 0.13** -0.04 -0.05 
Moneyness- -0.15*** -0.25*** -0.36*** 
HWM*Moneyness- 0.05* 0.11*** 0.19* 
VIXt-1 0.04 0.09 -0.04 
∆VIX -0.03 0.00 0.52 
σ-1Index 0.08 0.15*** -0.07 
∆ σIndex 0.01 0.03** 0.00 
σ-1 -0.76*** -0.74*** -0.71*** r-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 HWM -0.04 -0.00 -0.08 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Observations 384 1152 378 Adj. R2 58.0% 47.6% 42.3% 
*,  ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
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Figure 3.1 Risk style distribution of Shifting Funds vs. All Funds 
 
Out of a total of 6176 hedge funds in data there are 1572 hedge funds that change risk exposures 
at 10% significance level in at least one calendar year during 1994 and 2008. The graph compares 
the percentage of each risk style for both shifting funds and the whole hedge fund family. 
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Figure 3.2 Year distribution of Shifting Funds vs. All Funds 
 
Out of a total of 6176 hedge funds in data there are 1572 hedge funds that change risk exposures 
at 10% significance level in at least one calendar year during 1994 and 2008. The graph compares 
the percentage of the calendar year during which changes in risk exposures take place for both 
shifting funds and the whole hedge fund family. 
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APPENDIX A
MATH DERIVATIONS IN CHAPTER 1
A.1 Optimal Effort Level in Model I
Following we solve the investor’s optimization problem in (1.5) for the optimal effort
level e∗ she wants to induce from the manager, given the fixed fee contract in (1.8). Math-
ematically,
max
e
E[G] =
∫
g(Ir− f (u¯0+ c(e)))dF(r|e) (A-1)
The FOC
dE[G]
de
=
∫
g(Ir− f (u¯0+ c(e))) fe(r|e)dr
+
∫
g′(Ir− f (u¯0+ c(e))) ·− f ′(u¯0+ c(e))c′(e) f (r|e)dr (A-2)
Given the investor’s CARA utility function in (1.13), the FOC becomes,
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dE[G]
de
=
∫
−exp(−λp(Ir− f (u¯0+ c(e)))) 1√
2piσ
exp(−(r− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · r− x(e)
σ2
· x′(e)dr
+
∫
λp exp(−λp(Ir− f (u¯0+ c(e)))) ·− f ′c′ 1√
2piσ
exp(−(r− x(e))
2
2σ2
)dr
= 0 (A-3)
Substituting r− x(e) by t in each integral, we have,
dE[G]
de
= x′ exp(−λp f (u¯0+ c(e)))
∫
−exp(−λpI(t+ x) 1√
2piσ
exp(− t
2
2σ2
) · t
σ2
· x′(e)dt
− λp f ′c′ exp(−λp f (u¯0+ c(e)))
∫
λp exp(−λpI(t+ x)) 1√
2piσ
exp(− t
2
2σ2
)dt
= 0 (A-4)
Simplify and we have,
dE[G]
de
= λpI exp(−λpIx+
λ 2p I2σ2
2
)x′(e)
− −λp f ′c′(e)exp(−λpIx+
λ 2p I2σ2
2
)
= 0 (A-5)
Substitute f ′(x) by 1λax , given the manager’s CARA utility function in (1.14),
c′(e) =
I
f ′
x′(e)
= λaI(u¯0+ c(e))x′(e) (A-6)
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A.2 Optimal Effort Level in Model II
Following we solve the investor’s optimization problem in (2.7) for the optimal effort
level e∗∗ she wants to induce from the manager, given the fixed fee contract in (1.9).
The FOC
∂E[U ]
∂e
=
∫
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|e)dr− c′(e)
=
∫
−exp(−λa(αI+β Ir)) 1√
2piσ
exp(−(r− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · r− x(e)
σ2
· x′(e)dr
= 0 (A-7)
Substituting r− x(e) by t, we have,
∂E[U ]
∂e
= exp(−λaαI−λaβ Ix)
∫
− 1√
2piσ
exp(−λaβ It− t
2
2σ2
) · t
σ2
· x′(e)dt
= 0 (A-8)
Simplify and we have,
c′(e) = λaβ I exp(−λaαI−λaβ Ix(e)+ λ
2
aβ 2I2σ2
2
)x′(e) (A-9)
A.3 The Second Term in (1.22)
When r < 0, u(αI)− u(αI+β Ir) > 0. Also, when r < 0, r− x(e) < 0, and therefore
fe(r|e) = 1√2piσ exp(−
(r−x)2
2σ2 )x
′(e)< 0, since x′(e)> 0 for all e by assumption.
Since the integrand is everywhere positive on (−∞,0], the integral,
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∫ 0
−∞
[u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e∗∗∗)dr < 0 (A-10)
A.4 The MP in (1.27) Larger than in (1.22)
Rewrite (1.27)
c′(ek) =
∫ 0
−∞
u(αI) fe(r|ek)dr+
∫ ∞
0
u(αI+β Ir) fe(r|ek))dr
+
∫ 0
−∞
(u((1− k)αI+ kIr)−u(αI)) fe(r|ek)dr
+
∫ ∞
0
(u((1− k)(αI+β Ir)+ kIr)−u(αI+β Ir)) fe(r|ek)dr
(A-11)
Note that the first two terms are the MC in (1.22), we then need to prove the sum of the
last two terms is positive. Perform Tylor series expansion on the integrand in the third term
(denoted by T ) about around αI, assuming k is small,
T =
∫ 0
−∞
(u((1− k)αI+ kIr)−u(αI)) fe(r|ek)dr
≈
∫ 0
−∞
(u(αI)+u′(αI)k(Ir−αI)−u(αI)) fe(r|ek)dr
=
∫ 0
−∞
u′(αI)k(Ir−αI) 1√
2piσ
exp(−(h− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · h− x(e)
σ2
· x′(e)dr
(A-12)
Denote the fourth term by S and perform Tylor series expansion on the integrand around
αI+β Ir. Similarly,
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S=
∫ ∞
0
u′(αI+β Ir)k(Ir−β Ir−αI) 1√
2piσ
exp(−(h− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · h− x(e)
σ2
· x′(e)dr
(A-13)
Let α=0, then,
T |α=0 =
∫ 0
−∞
u′(0)kIr
1√
2piσ
exp(−(h− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · h− x(e)
σ2
· x′(e)dr > 0 (A-14)
S|α=0 =
∫ ∞
0
u′(β Ir)k(Ir(1−β )) 1√
2piσ
exp(−(h− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · h− x(e)
σ2
·x′(e)dr> 0 (A-15)
By continuity, T > 0 and S> 0. Therefore, the MP in (1.27) is larger than that in (1.22).
A.5 The shape of A(h,e)
∂A(h,e)
∂h
= [u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] fe(r|e)
= [u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)] 1√
2piσ
exp(−(h− x(e))
2
2σ2
) · h− x(e)
σ2
· x′(e)
(A-16)
Since u(x) is increasing in x, u(αI)−u(αI+β Ir)< 0. Therefore, the sign of ∂A(h,e)∂h conversely
depends on the sign of h− x(e).
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A.6 A(h,e)< 0
we see in (1.34) that A(h,e) decreases in h when h> x(e). Now consider that x(e) = 0.
Since A(h,e) = 0 and A(h,e) decreases in h when h> x(e) = 0, A(h,e) is thus negative for
all h > 0. By the continuity of A(h,e) in e, there exists an h0 > 0 and e0 > 0, such that
when h> h0 and e< e0, A(h,e)< 0. That is, if A(h,e)< 0 is negative on a point of x, then
it must be negative on a continuous interval around x.
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATION OF HWM AND GROSS
RETURNS
Solving for the HWM and gross return series of hedge funds.
(1) Lipper TASS database reports a variable called ‘InitialNAV ’1 and we define that for
hedge fund i,
NAV ∗i,0 = InitialNAV (B-1)
(2) The reported NAVs are based on net returns.
NAVi,t = NAVi,t−1× (1+ rNeti,t ) (B-2)
(3) The HWM is updated monthly.
NAV ∗i,t =Max{NAVi,t ,NAV ∗i,t−1} (B-3)
(4) Management fees are paid and incentive fees are accrued also on a monthly basis.2
MgtFeei,t = NAVi,t× MgtFee%1−MgtFee% (B-4)
1If the value is missing, we use the first reported NAV instead.
2Assuming that the reported NAVs are net of fees.
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AccruedIncentFeei,t =Max{NAVi,t−NAV ∗i,t−1,0}×
IncentFee%
1− IncentFee% (B-5)
(5) The calculation of gross returns takes into account management fees and accrued
incentive fees.
rGrossi,t =
(NAVi,t+AccruedIncentFeei,t)− (NAVi,t−1+AccruedIncentFeei,t−1)+MgtFeei,t
NAVi,t−1+AccruedIncentFeei,t−1
(B-6)
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